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Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, 
and the Virtues of Casuistry 
By PAUL R. TREMBLAY* 
EACH SUNDAY, The New York Times Magazine features a column enti-
tled The Ethicist, written by Randy Cohen.l In this interesting and witty 
column, Cohen answers questions, "Dear Abby"-style, from readers 
seeking his advice about whether some action or behavior is ethical or 
not. The most intriguing quality of the column is this: week after 
week, answer after answer, Cohen is right in each of his responses. He 
seldom, if ever, waivers about his advice, or makes excuses about 
moral ambiguities or relativist preferences. Instead, he parses each 
case before him carefully, assesses the ethical implications, and tells 
his readers whether the conduct in question is OK or not. I have yet to 
see him come out wrong.2 
Lawyers, of course, encounter ethical questions and morally un-
certain choice opportunities on a regular basis. Many observers-and 
by many I mean many-believe that the legal profession is riddled with 
ethically troublesome practices,3 implying that lawyers not infre-
quently choose the wrong answer to their ethical questions, or resolve 
* Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I offer deep thanks to those 
kind souls who read and commented on an earlier, briefer version of these ideas: Dan 
Coquillette, Russell Engler, Dick Huber, Mary Helen McNeal, Alex Scherr, Avi Soifer, and 
Mark Spiegel. I also am grateful for the rich assistance provided by Rocky LeAnn Pilgrim 
and Amy Leonard, my research assistants. This work was supported by the generosity of 
Hale & Dorr, LLP, and Boston College Law School Dean John Garvey. 
l. See, e.g., Randy Cohen, A Child's Debt, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 10, 2002, at 22. 
2. Apparently, though, others have. See Randy Cohen, On Second Thought, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Mar. 31, 2002, at 20 (responding to letters criticizing his advice). In response to the 
criticisms, Cohen changed two of his opinions. His doing so only underscores the point for 
which I cite Cohen's work-that ethics can be a reasoned, analytical process in which argu-
ment and dialogue might lead to acceptable and coherent answers. 
3. For a sampling of the critics, see SOL M. LINOWlTZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: 
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 81-96 (2000) [hereinafter D. 
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE]; Amy C. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the 
Lawyers First? Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 fuRY. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 835 
(1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239, 1239 (1991) 
[hereinafter Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics]; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Para-
digm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the 
659 
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their moral uncertainties ineptly. The widespread criticism assumes, 
quite naturally, that the critics possess a reliable sense of what is good 
and what is not, much like Randy Cohen's talent. Notwithstanding this 
critical trend, the literature on moral decisionmaking by lawyers re-
flects a sustained appreciation for, and sometimes deference to, a con-
ception of moral pluralism and "personal values."4 The assertion that 
the legal profession lacks a shared account of normative ethics is as 
widespread as the claim that the profession is experiencing a moral 
crisis.5 
These companion observations are not easily reconcilable. In this 
Article I attempt to puzzle through the seemingly incompatible wor-
ries that lawyers are morally at risk and that values are personal and 
non-negotiable. I do so as, to borrow Alasdair MacIntyre's phrase, a 
"plain person"6-that is, I am neither a philosopher nor do I possess 
the training, the discipline, or the time to understand deeper, meta-
physical questions of value as thoroughly as full time philosophers and 
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1257 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm 
Shift]· 
4. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary of the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 259, 305 (1995) [hereinafter Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary] (labeling "demonstra-
bly erroneous" the premise that conscientious lawyers agree on the right way to be a good 
lawyer and a good person); Bruce Green, The Rille of Personal Values in Professional Decision-
making, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 33, 34 (1998) (personal values as "idiosyncratic"); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and Professional Ethics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 133, 141 
(1992) [hereinafter Hazard, Personal Values] (referring to values as "subjective"); Lisa G. 
Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment In Legal Ethics Courses: A Dialogue 
About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 457, 463 (1998) (noting the opinion of Lizabeth 
Moody, Dean of Stetson University College of Law, that "no true consensus exists in the 
profession about the values of the profession"). 
5. The two claims are often made by the same commentator. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feld-
man, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885, 
929 (1996) (lawyers "lack a shared, complete account of normative ethics by which to 
judge [a criticized law firm's] particular actions"); id. at 932 ("[Elthical error is serious 
error: Our aim is its avoidance."); Hazard, Personal Values, supra note 4, at 139 (values are 
"subjective"); Hazard, Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 3, at 1239 (profession is in crisis). 
6. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosaphy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, 
66 AM. CATii. PHIL. Q. 3 (1992). MacIntyre himself has borrowed the phrase from the work 
of Sir David Ross. SeeW.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 41 (1930). Other ethics writers 
use similar phrases to emphasize the gulf between the sophisticated philosophers and the 
persons who must make ethical choices in their daily lives. See, e.g., Carl Elliot, Where Ethics 
Comes From and What to Do About It, 22 HAsTINGS CTR. REp. 28 (1992) (referring to "ordinary 
people"). I happened to discover recently that the "plain person" classification has rele-
vance in fields other than the complicated world of moral philosophy. See Fenton v. 
Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1968) (referring to non-golfers as 
"plain people," relative to golfers). 
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ethicists7 are likely to do. I am also a clinical law teacher, so in my 
puzzling I tend to look for pragmatic, workable ways to talk about 
value, worth, norms, and virtues. 
I suggest here that there may be ways, at least pragmatic ways, to 
talk and teach about values and virtues with lawyers and law students. 
My basic thesis is as follows: There is much to be gained by a search 
for common, shared norms, and for "paradigm cases" representing 
agreed-upon sentiments about how moral issues ought to be resolved, 
as a basis for reasoned conversation about more complex moral di-
lemmas and conflicts. The process I will describe is known as "casu-
istry."8 It has roots in early Jesuit thinking9 and has experienced 
significant popularity in modern bioethics thinking since the 1990s.10 
Casuistry is a form of ethical reasoning that involves the close analysis 
of particular cases, seeking ethical guidance in an inductive manner 
rather than deductively through the application of moral theory. Ca-
suists find meaning through paradigm cases and maxims. A case 
presenting moral ambiguity may be compared to a series of paradigm 
cases and analyzed by reference to accepted maxims, in order to ar-
rive at a reasonably satisfactory solution to the conflict at hand. II 
The fact that individuals argue about moral questions, using rea-
soning and logic, combined with the weakness of any claims about 
relativism or subjectivism, shows us that the possibilities for identifying 
consensus exist. Disagreements will continue to thrive, of course, but 
they tend, at bottom, not to be about "values" at all. Most seeming 
moral disagreement represents, instead, disputes about facts, predic-
tions, biases, history, perceptions, and the like. Not all disagreement 
fits this description, of course, but most will. Recognizing a founda-
7. judge Richard Posner derisively refers to scholarly philosophers as "academic 
moralists." See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, III HAAv. L. REV. 
1637, 1639-40 (1998). Without joining in Posner's rather snide treatment of professional 
philosophers, we can agree that his phrase captures a segment of the population very dif-
ferent from most of the rest of us. See also Martha Nussbaum, Still Wonhy of Praise, 111 fuRV. 
L. REv. 1776, 1794-95 (1998) (accepting Posner's critique that most academic moral phi-
losophy writing is inaccessible to plain persons). 
8. See ALBERT JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CAsUISTRV: A HISTORY OF 
MORAL REAsONING (1989). 
9. See id. at 139-51. 
10. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, MAKJNG MORTAL CHOICES: THREE EXERCISES IN MORAL CAS-
UISTRY (1997); MARK G. KUCZEWSKJ, FRAGMENTATION AND CONSENSUS: COMMUNITARIAN AND 
CAsUIST BIOETHICS (1997); john Anas, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in 
Bioethics, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 29 (1991); Annette Braunack-Mayer, Casuistry as Bioethical 
Method: An Empirical PlffSpective, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 71 (2001). 
11. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Medical Ethics, Moral Philosophy and Moral Tradition, 25 
Soc. SCI. IN MED. 637, 639 (1987). 
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tion of shared norms permits in moral disputes the same kind of ana-
lytic process law professors use to teach students about substantive law. 
If lawyers and law students are open to learning about how best to 
make challenging moral choices (a significant qualification, this), a 
casuistic process offers some hope for nonrelativistic, reasoned 
discourse. 
My inquiry proceeds through the following steps. I begin, well, at 
the beginning. I start by making explicit the differing reasons why law 
schools teach about ethics and values. I suggest three possible reasons: 
(1) for the same reasons they teach torts, that is, because the "ethics" 
of the legal profession can be useful to practitioners as basic substan-
tive law; (2) for the same reasons bioethicists develop methods of ethi-
cal analysis, that is, to aid good faith, conflicted professionals to find 
ways to choose amongst similarly attractive (or similarly offensive) eth-
ical alternatives; and (3) for the same reasons therapists and jailers do 
their work, that is, to provide incentives for bad or misguided people 
to do good things. I point out that the first of these has little, but still 
some, relevance to an inquiry about the role of values teaching. The 
second and third goals are more directly relevant, but they tend to get 
conflated. It helps, I suggest, to distinguish between teaching good 
people how to be better and teaching bad people how to be good. 
In Parts II and III we consider the challenges of working with the 
"good people." Part II reviews some objections to consideration of 
moral deliberation as a reasoned, substantive topic, including the 
common worry about relativism, questions about the role of faith, and 
concerns that values are simply too personal and incommensurable to 
permit either teaching about them or reliance upon them in profes-
sional ethical contexts. I conclude in Part II that while some impor-
tant subset of moral conflicts involves inherently incommensurable 
value choices, a more significant portion of that world does not. Most 
values, we see, are not idiosyncratic or subjective, but instead are con-
nected to deeply shared ideas about what is good. 
Part III begins to work with the conception of shared norms. I 
start this Part with a critique of the use of moral theory as a basis for 
either working from, or obtaining, consensus about value. I then de-
scribe a more friendly and practicable approach to moral delibera-
tion-that of casuistry. I follow the introduction to casuistry with an 
extended review of, and critique of, recent work by Alan Wolfe,12 who 
12. ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM: THE IMPOSSIBLE IDEA THAT DEFINES THE WAY WE 
LIVE Now (2001) [hereinafter A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM]; ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, 
AFTER ALL: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT: GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY, 
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has performed elaborate and extensive surveys of and interviews with 
typical Americans about their moral beliefs. I use the Wolfe oeuvre to 
develop and sustain my argument that most moral disagreement, in-
cluding the all too familiar culture wars, does not represent a funda-
mental disconnect about what is worthy and what is not, but 
represents instead competing versions of how the world operates. We 
may not, of course, be any more confident that we will resolve that 
disagreement than we will resolve disagreement about questions of 
value, but, it seems fair to say, disputes about fact and about history 
have a more firm analytic grounding than true disputes about value 
(which I claim are rarer than we might suppose). 
Finally, Part IV changes focus, and turns to consideration of the 
motivation to care about doing good. In puzzling about what I will call 
the "felons, whores, and jerks" in the legal profession, I suggest several 
possible perspectives. First, it may be that the critics are wrong in judg-
ing the bad lawyers' behaviors as bad. Second, if (as is likely) the crit-
ics are not wrong, it might be that the bad lawyers are simply 
sociopaths, in which case the academy cannot be too sanguine that it 
might make any difference to those lawyers at all. This "sociopath" 
thesis is also unlikely, it seems. Third, if the behavior is indeed bad, 
perhaps the lawyers intended to do the right thing but just got it 
wrong, in which case the "bad" lawyers end up not as corrupt or soci-
opathic, but instead as deliberatively inept. If this supposition is true, 
these lawyers join the "good" lawyers in the audience for teaching 
about ethical deliberation. Finally, and perhaps of most interest, 
maybe the bad lawyers do such unscrupulous things because of the 
demands and pressures, institutional or otherwise, they feel within 
their work lives. I explore the possibility that the most promising solu-
tion to the bad lawyering phenomenon ought to come from institu-
tional changes, rather than changes in the character or the 
decisionmaking prowess of the lawyers. 
I. Why Ethics? 
There are important reasons why a professional school might 
choose to focus its attention on questions of ethics and value, but 
those reasons cover several distinct goals. Any discussion of the role of 
values education in a law school ought to distinguish among the sev-
RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALl1Y, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH 
OTHER (1998) [hereinafter A. WOLFE, ONE NATION]. 
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eral possible purposes for ethics teaching. Here I offer three such 
possibilities. 
A. "It's Like Asking Why We Teach Torts": Ethics As Doctrine 
Most of ethics instruction in law school is in fact instruction in the 
"law of lawyering"-that is, that body of doctrine developed by courts, 
bar associations,13 and disciplinary authorities which lawyers must un-
derstand in order to practice law effectively for their clients. 14 This 
complicated legal material plays a critical role in client representa-
tion, and law students should know about it before they leave school. 
In answer to the question "why teach legal ethics?", the teachers' re-
sponse might be simple: "It's like asking 'why teach torts?' You just 
cannot practice law without knowing this stuff." 
Law schools teach torts primarily for externallyjocused, instrumen-
tal purposes. A graduate of law school will be a bad lawyer, and will 
offer poor service, if she doesn't understand torts when she starts to 
practice. She will lose her cases, or commit malpractice, or fail to ob-
13. Bar associations often issue advisory ethics opinions, which form an important 
part of the doctrine affecting lawyer behavior. See Peter Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Mean-
ingful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct (forthcoming 2002) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that advisory ethics opinions by 
bar associations need to be regulated and limited in their influence). 
14. Some law school textbooks for legal profession courses shy away from the phrase 
"legal ethics" and rely instead on titles reflecting the regulatory law of lawyering themes. 
See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, THE RULES OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (1996); JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS 
(2000). Other text titles allude to a distinction between the regulatory and the ethical 
components of this topic. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAw AND ETHICS (6th ed. 2001); G. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (3d 
ed. 1999); L. RAy PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAw OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(1989). Indeed, only one legal profession textbook has opted to apply the simple appella-
tion "Legal Ethics," without any reference to law or regulation. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & 
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (3d ed. 2001). 
The profound development of the substantive law of lawyering, and its eclipsing the 
role of "softer" questions of moral issues, has been noted by many observers. See, e.g., 
Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 1273, 1274 (1998) [hereinafter Rostain, Ethics Lost] ("a regulatory approach is inad-
equate to ensure that lawyer-made law serves broader societal purposes. Regulation is a 
poor substitute for legal ethics."); Michael!. Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers-Citizen-
ship and Maral Responsibility: A jurisprudence far Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 816-17 
(1990). It may best be reflected in the inaugural publication of a Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GoV-
ERNING LAWYERS (2001). The editors have entitled the Restatement as the "Third," despite 
its being only the first such publication, apparently to keep it in lock-step with the other 
Restatement projects. It is not a little ironic that a treatise intended to reflect the highest 
standards of professionalism should resort to a fib for its own organizational uniformity 
purposes. 
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tain clients, if she doesn't know what the basic legal principles are and 
how they work. 15 In some (but not all) ways, legal ethics is just like 
torts-a graduate should know about, say, the instrumental uses of 
Rule 11 motions I6 or motions to disqualify an opposing lawyer for al-
leged conflicts of interest, 17 if only to defeat those Rambo lawyers who 
resort to exploiting these "ethics" rules for tactical gains. I8 If she 
doesn't know these tactical ploys, a lawyer will be at a serious 
disadvantage. 
In two critical ways, though, legal ethics is different from torts, 
and those differences affect conversations and teaching in this area. 
First, a significant part of the law of lawyering instruction is instrumen-
tal but internallyjocused. The purpose of the teaching is not to affect 
others' behavior, through strategy or argument, but to enable the stu-
dent to understand for herself what a proper response is, and to assess 
risks to the lawyer's career rather than to her client's case. I9 This as-
pect of ethics instruction is, perhaps counter intuitively, less interest-
15. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS 
TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CON-
TINUUM, REpORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAw SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING 
THE GAP 124-25 (1992) [hereinafter, MACCRATE REpORT]. This topic is of course far more 
complicated, but the basic point is sound. This student may never see a torts case, so for 
her the arguments just developed are specious. Obviously law schools make judgments 
about the odds that a practicing lawyer will encounter a torts case, or a torts doctrine-like 
issue, and conclude that a well-rounded lawyer ought to know the basics of this doctrine. 
The other apparent flaw in the argument in the text is that many topics are never covered 
in law school at all, and other topics (say, Internet law) come into existence after many 
students have finished their law school instruction. When pressed, law schools will admit 
that they are teaching less "substance" and more "process" -the ability to think like a law-
yer and to learn how to understand legal issues as they are encountered. For an administra-
tor's view of these choices, see John Garvey, The Business of Running a Law Schoo~ 33 TOL. L. 
REv. 37 (2001). 
16. See Kevin E. Mohr, Legal Ethics and a Civil Action, 23 SEATTLE V. L. REv. 283, 
284-87 (1999); Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the 
Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CONN. L. REv. 155, 156-59 (1999) (noting the effective use 
of Rule 11 motions to limit plaintiff civil rights actions). 
17. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231, 238 
(Kan. 1999); Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461, 464 (Me. 1994); Kassis v. 
Teachers' Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 717 N.E.2d 674,677 (N.Y. 1999); Sargent County Bank v. 
Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 871 (N.D. 1993). 
18. See D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
19. This is a perspective which I have frequently observed practitioners share with law 
students: "Legal ethics and professional responsibility are the most important topics you 
will study in law school, because they affect you directly, and not just your clients' inter-
ests." Several commentators have made a similar argument. See Kathleen Clark, The Legacy 
of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HAST. LJ. 673, 675 (2000); Russell Pearce, Teach-
ing Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law Schoo~ 29 Loy. V. CHI. L. 
REv. 719, 722 (1998) [hereinafter Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously]. In my experience, this 
argument has remarkably little persuasive appeal to students. 
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ing to law students than the former externally-focused topics, and may 
account in part for the poor track record of legal ethics courses.20 I 
suspect two reasons for the lack of interest. To the extent that the 
message is: ''You need this to keep the bar off your back, so you're the 
client here," students correctly perceive that bar discipline is a pretty 
rare phenomenon, particularly in the context of the topics that legal 
ethics courses tend to emphasize.21 On the other hand, to the extent 
that the message is: ''You need this because you will be the only arbiter 
about what is right, so essentially you're the judge here," students, I sus-
pect, worry less about the risk of error under those circumstances, at 
least in the classroom setting.22 By contrast, when students face chal-
lenging, if private, professional responsibility choices in a true repre-
sentational setting, such as a law school clinic, their engagement in 
the topic is profound. 23 
20. As commentators note repeatedly, legal ethics and professional responsibility 
courses are not well respected in the academy. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. 
Koniak, Rule, Story and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
145, 146 (1996) (stating that "legal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education," 
and that many law teachers "remain convinced that the subject is unteachable"); Bruce 
Green, Less Is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARy L. REv. 357, 357 (1998); 
David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 31,37-38 (1995) (stating that "the legal ethics course is-not to put too fine 
a point on it-the dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by oveIWorked 
deans or underpaid adjuncts and generally disregarded by the faculty at large"); Pearce, 
Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 723; William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal 
Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics]. 
21. Bar discipline tends to follow from stealing client money and from unthinkable 
sloppiness or conflicts of interest. The bar disciplinary authorities are far too understaffed 
and oveIWorked to attend to more ordinary, but clearly unlawful, confidentiality, conflicts, 
or deception breaches. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS, 
at § 110 cmt. b (2000) (observing that "disciplinary enforcement against frivolous litigation 
is rare"); Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 817, 819 (2000); Amy Mashburn, Professionalism As Class Ideology: Civility Codes and 
Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 704 n.255 (1994). 
22. Much of the doctrine of professional responsibility trains the lawyer to make deci-
sions in a role where she will be the judge. Her audience, as it were, is herself. The risk of 
being wrong is not a public one, as it would be in torts (where her mistake in judgment 
would be known to an opposing lawyer and perhaps to ajudge), but a private one. I sus-
pect that, rather than transforming this topic into a more compelling learning experience 
for a law student, this fact renders the topic less interesting, at least in a classroom setting. 
23. Many commentators have noted the benefits of teaching ethics in a clinical set-
ting. See, e.g., Anthony E. Alfieri, Ethical Commitments, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 199 (1996); 
Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759, 1770 (1993); Luban 
& Millemann, supra note 20, at 40; Joan L. O'Sullivan et aI., Ethical Decisionmaking and Ethics 
Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CLINICAL L. REv. 109, 142-44 (1996). 
I have taught for many years in a civil clinic where students represent poor clients in 
actual disputes. Our course assigns students the .classic interviewing and counseling text by 
Binder, Bergman and Price. See D. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CEN-
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There is a second way in which legal ethics is not just like torts, 
and it involves the role of one's "personal"24 values in a law school 
curriculum. As a substantive doctrine, torts, it is fair to say, implicates 
deep questions of value and moral judgment.25 Courts which favor 
more liberal compensation of victims reflect different moral judg-
ments compared to courts which shift the costs of accidents to the 
injured parties.26 Questions of personal responsibility, of fairness, of 
justice, and of efficiency abound in this substantive area. One can eas-
ily imagine27 a student enrolled in a torts class who has arrived at law 
school with strongly held beliefs about each of these moral topics, and 
who sees important issues to debate in the class. The student's value 
judgments will playa critical role in the analysis of the doctrine, but 
when the rubber hits the road, when the instrumental goals of the 
course kick in, those value judgments are far less important. To re-
present his clients effectively, this student needs to know how those 
value judgments have been made (that is, what are the common law 
or statutory trends) and how he can use the resulting doctrine.28 
Let's now move next door to the ethics class. Like in torts, the 
doctrine of professional responsibility is imbued with rich moral ques-
tions, the suggested resolutions of which mayor may not jibe with the 
sentiments the students assimilated before enrolling in school. The 
TERED APPROACH (1990). That text preaches a client-centered philosophy, and students try 
to implement it in their work. The students, though, almost to a person, find the theory of 
client-centeredness much harder to implement in practice, where they often feel a very 
strong desire to act paternalistically. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, The Story of Mr. G: Reflections 
upon the Questionably Competent Client, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1179 (2000) (describing one 
such case). My consistent experience is that students struggle deeply and genuinely with 
this issue, even though there is no sanction from any judge or opposing lawyer were they to 
choose the "wrong" approach. 
24. See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text for a modest challenge to the no-
tion that values ought to be described as "personal." 
25. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in 
Action, 35 LAw & SOC'y REv. 275 (2001). While I have been using the example of torts to 
make my comparisons, there is no magic to that randomly-chosen example. Any law school 
doctrinal course-property, contracts, criminal law or procedure, constitutional law, and 
so on-would fit just as well as an example for comparison. 
26. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical 
Tort Law and the Cooperative Firstparty Insurance Movement, 114 HARv. L. REv. 690, 705 (2001). 
27. I do not teach torts, so I may be assuming too much here. 
28. It is also likely (although this is in fact a pure guess) that a student's preordained 
value judgments about, say, the role of personal responsibility in allocating the costs of 
accidents within the tort system will be relatively open to reexamination as the novice legal 
trainee learns about the complicated tort doctrine for the first time. My guess in contrast-
ing this process to the experience in an ethics course is that the student's openness to 
reexamination is less likely in the latter setting, because the activities seem more "per-
sonal." See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
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courses look similar in that respect, but in one respect they may be 
critically different. Unlike the torts experience, when the rubber hits 
the road in the professional responsibility course, it may be much 
more difficult to ask the student to forget, for now, his existing moral 
sentiments as he acts in the lawyer's role. For this reason, it seems 
more likely that objections about imposed values and relativist con-
ceptions will surface more frequently in legal ethics discussions than 
in tort doctrine discussions. In other words, it is one thing to conclude 
a torts dialogue with the advice, "I can understand your arguments 
about efficiency and fairness in this strict liability context. You do see, 
though, that the Restatement and the common law trends go in the 
opposite direction, right?" It is entirely different to conclude a class-
room legal ethics discussion with something like this: "I hear and un-
derstand quite clearly your arguments that by carefully saying only 
literally true statements you have not 'lied,' even if you may have mis-
led your audience, and therefore you cannot be criticized for getting a 
rather generous settlement from your opponent in the negotiation. In 
fact, what you did was indeed 'lying,' and it was wrong."29 I do not 
mean to imply that the latter statement by the professor is inappropri-
ate; in fact, I believe it is quite right.3o My point is that the latter con-
versation is much more likely to induce objections or worries about 
"indoctrination," "imposing values," and relativism. We reach those 
objections below.31 
Before proceeding to the more central purposes of ethics instruc-
tion and conversation, we ought to highlight one other goal achieved 
by such a focus on the law of lawyering. Teaching substantive Restate-
ment-like law to students, in addition to offering instrumental tools 
for representation, conveys messages about value orientations 
adopted by, or inherent within the organization of, the legal profes-
29. I draw this example from the rich critique of misleading in negotiation offered by 
Gerald WetIaufer. See Cerald WetIaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REv. 
1219 (1990). See also Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 
CEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994). 
30. Of course, the dialogue cannot be as stark as I have left it in my example. Simply 
defining a moral conclusion as wrong is pure dogmatism and has no justification. But 
carefully reasoning through with a student the arguments, justifications, and precedents 
about the use of deception to gain benefits that could not be gained without deception is 
an entirely proper role of ethics education. Just as a law professor would not hesitate to 
conclude that a student's reading of Supreme Court doctrine is flawed, and tell the student 
so, the professor may similarly offer judgments about the analysis of ethics questions. See 
Paul R. Tremblay, The NI?W Casuistry, 12 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1999) [hereinafter 
Tremblay, The NI?W Casuistry]. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text. 
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sion.32 Those orientations likely will play an important role in the 
moral deliberation of lawyers, who frequently adjust sentiments drawn 
from ordinary citizenry activity to conform to professional contexts 
and demands.33 
B. "It's Like What the Bioethicists Do": Training for Moral 
Deliberation 
A commonly offered ambition for legal ethics instruction is "to 
channel lawyers' behavior in socially desirable ways."34 The argument 
proceeds roughly as follows: Observers of the legal profession report 
substantial evidence that the standards of practice are far less honora-
ble than they should be.35 Something needs to be done by the profes-
sion and by those who train the professionals to improve the ethical 
quality of its practitioners. One important remedy is to rethink and 
strengthen ethics instruction within law schools.36 
In considering the relationship between ethics instruction and 
lawyer behavior, however, we encounter an intriguing phenomenon. 
The professionalism movement37 and its accompanying fears about 
the "crisis"38 within the profession tend to describe lawyers acting 
badly. The stories are well known and all too common.39 A Houston 
law firm enabled the Enron Corporation to craft its plausibly legal 
32. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. I (1999) [hereinafter Wendel, Public Values). 
33. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. 
REv. 116 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)); 
David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to 
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004 (1990); W. Bradley Wendel, Professional Roles and 
Moral Agency, 89 CEO. LJ. 667 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR AD-
VERSARIES: THE MORAUTY OF ROLES IN PUBUC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)); Wendel, 
Public Values, supra note 32, at 26-27. 
34. W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. ll3, ll4 
(2000) [hereinafter Wendel, Value Pluralism]. See also D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF Jus. 
TICE, supra note 3, at 200-03; Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 728. 
35. See ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBUC SERVICE:" A 
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDUNG OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 
(1986) (known widely as the "Stanley Report"). See also sources cited supra note 3. 
36. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 720-21; Clark, supra note 19, at 
675-76. 
37. See Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 261-63; Pearce, Professionalism 
Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1230. 
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
39. Marianne Jennings collects lawyer headlines, and she reports the following news 
items about the profession: 
We steal client funds; we get involved in drug rings and occasional murder; we 
form gaggles to besiege companies with class actions and punitive damage suits 
over certain practices; we don't care whether you are guilty or innocent; we can 
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reporting and incorporation plans which enriched management while 
costing ordinary shareholders and employees a lifetime of investments 
and pensions,40 much like lawyers worked with OPM to bilk its lend-
ers41 and with Lincoln Savings & Loan to mislead investors and fed-
eral regulators.42 So-called "Rambo" lawyers act like 'Jerks"43 by 
aggressively and deceptively exploiting well-intended discovery or pro-
cedural devices to thwart principled inquiry and fair hearing on the 
merits.44 Aggressive and insensitive lawyers representing the manufac-
turer of a flawed, potentially deadly birth control device cross examine 
women users of the device about their sexual and bathroom habits. 45 
A lawyer in a deposition sneers at his opposing counsel with the 
words, "Don't 'Joe' me, asshole. You can ask some questions, but get 
off that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat wagon."46 
And so on. 
The prevailing theme of the criticism of this kind of lawyering 
behavior is one of greedy or insensitive lawyers paying insufficient at-
help you avoid your obligations; and we can help you make a little dough by 
leaking information. 
Marianne M. Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have Abso-
lutely Nothing to Do With Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative, 1996 WIse. L. 
REv. 1223, 1225. 
40. See Diana B. Henriques with Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog Over hnron, and the Legal Land-
scape, N.Y. TIMES, January 27, 2002, at § 3, p. 1 (reporting on the Houston law firm of 
Vinson & Elkins). See also William Powers,Jr., Report of Special Investigation Committee of 
Enron Corporation (Feb. 1,2002), available at http://nytimes.com/images/2002/02/03/ 
business/ 03powers. pdf. 
41. See OPM Leasing Services, Inc., in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILIlY OF LAWYERS (Phillip 
Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988). See also Feldman, supra note 5, at 924-25. 
42. The charges lodged by the Office of Thrift Supervision against the Kaye, Scholer, 
Fierman, Hays, & Handler law firm after their aggressive representation of Lincoln Savings 
& Loan have been documented in many sources. See, e.g.,JoHN T. NOONAN,JR. & RICHARD 
PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 147-51 (1997). See 
also William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temfr 
tations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); David Wilkins, Making 
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1163 (1993). 
43. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 121 n.24 (referring to the lawyer in 
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1993), who sought sanctions 
against opposing counsel for missing a deposition appearance because of a seriously ill 
father, as "a jerk"). 
44. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and Law-Down 
Tactics in the Courts, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 81, 83 (1991); Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of 
Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REv. 7, 50 (1987). 
45. See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CoRPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON 
SHIELD 194-95 (1985), quoted in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAw AND ETHICS 384-85 (3d ed. 1992). 
46. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del. 
1994) (reporting a transcript of the words of Texas lawyer Joseph D. Jamail). 
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tention to the interests of harmed third parties,47 the standards of 
common morality,48 and their own sense of moral integrity.49 
What should intrigue us about these stories is that in medical eth-
ics circles, where professionals encounter an equally rich mix of ethi-
cal challenges, the stories one hears are seldom about bad doctors, 
psychiatrists, or nurses. Instead, the rich literature and thoughtful de-
bates within bioethics50 tend to assume good faith, well-meaning ac-
tors trying their very best, amid much moral uncertainty, to come to 
the right or best decision, all things considered. 51 The doctors or 
nurses who make wrong decisions are not 'Jerks" or "whores"; they 
simply didn't think things through well enough.52 
This comparison to the bioethicists suggests an important distinc-
tion that is seldom explicit in legal ethics literature.53 The oft-heard 
stories about bad lawyers may dominate the discourse, but those bad 
lawyers are not the only, or even the primary, audience for legal ethics 
and moral deliberation conversations. Indeed, it might be that the 
most significant goal for ethics education is not to rehabilitate the un-
scrupulous lawyers, but to aid the good faith lawyers. The stories in 
this area may be less provocative, but they are likely far more common 
in day to day practice. 
47. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETH. 
ICS 123-35 (1998); joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on 
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1107 (1998). 
48. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 110 (1988); David 
B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv. 
1502, 1567 (1998). 
49. See Eleanor Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. V. L. REV. 823, 
824-25 (1996); Serena Steir, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. LJ 551, 553 
(1991). 
50. One footnote can hardly do justice to the wealth of scholarship addressing ap-
plied ethics in medicine and health care. For a sampling of some of the most common 
bioethics resources, see, for example, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &jAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES 
OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 17 (4th ed. 1994); GLENN C. GRABER & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THEORY 
AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ETHICS 97 (1989); ALBERT R.jONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A 
PRACTICAL APPROACH To ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (4th. ed. 1998); Kuc-
ZEWSKI, supra note 10; CLINICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (B. Hoffmaster et al. eds., 
1989); FOUR PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 319, 326 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994). 
51. See JONsEN ET AL., supra note 50, at 8-10. 
52. One possible exception to the generalizations I develop in the text is the increas-
ing concern about potential conflicts of interest within the medical research institutions, 
particularly regarding the influence of funding sources on research agendas and reporting 
of results. See, e.g., Michael j. Malinowski, Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilities in an Age of 
Academic·Industry Alliances, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 47, 56 (2001). 
53. An exception is the work of Bradley Wendel. See W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, 
Motivation, and the Professional Movement, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 557, 558 (2001). 
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C. "It's Perhaps a Little Like Therapy or Prison or Salvation": The 
Sociopath Thesis 
The third goal of legal ethics discourse and teaching is arguably 
different from the one just described. Like bioethicists, legal ethicists 
ought to develop methods and practices to aid good faith lawyers to 
deliberate better about moral choices. 54 But unlike the bioethicists,55 
the legal ethicists claim an additional agenda-to minimize the popu-
lation of, or the harm caused by, what we might refer to as the 
"felons,"56 "whores,"57 and 'Jerks"58 within the profession. Getting the 
bad people to be not so bad, then, seems an explicit purpose of legal 
ethics instruction. 59 In this way the educators' role is not unlike that of 
therapists, or jailers, or clerics-they aspire to rehabilitate the bad 
folks, or (more sympathetically) the folks who do bad things. 
Noting this apparent purpose of ethics pedagogy invites the obvi-
ous inquiry: Is there some reason to believe that the troublesome be-
havior of the felons, whores, and jerks might be improved if their 
54. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 941. 
55. I do not intend to underestimate the institutional and role-driven bases for the 
differences between the professions. The ethical predicaments encountered by physicians 
tend to involve competing visions of good-between, say, a goal of beneficence and one of 
autonomy. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 38. The professional's per-
sonal interests (financial or performance-driven) are not apparently in play. Lawyering 
predicaments more often pose a caring posture against a hurtful one, with the lawyer's 
interests usually aligned with the hurtful alternative (for that is the option which benefits 
the lawyer's client). In this respect legal ethics resembles more closely business ethics, with 
stark antagonism between owners' and employees' or consumers' interests, than bioethics. 
Even recognizing the role-driven explanations for the differences between legal ethics and 
bioethics, the questions about the role of deliberative skill in improving lawyers' behaviors 
remain important ones. 
56. See infra note 62. See alsoJennings, supra note 39, at 1223 (noticing that "we lawyers 
were engaging in the type of behavior that often runs deep into felony behavior"); Lisa 
Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and nxpense Fraud fry Lawytmi, 12 CEO. J. LE· 
GAL ETHICS 205, 209-10, 211-14 (1999) [hereinafter Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking] (describ-
ing lawyers convicted of billing fraud and listing their prison sentences where 
appropriate) . 
57. See Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 601. See also infra note 70. I 
use the word "whore" in this Article with some trepidation. I intend it as a term of condem-
nation, describing a professional who would sell out his principles and his integrity for 
money and power. I do not, however, intend to cast aspersions on true prostitutes, those 
men or women who engage in sex for money. Their behaviors are, at least arguably, less 
flatly condemnable. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Teaching Prostitution Seriously, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REv. 709 (2001); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming 
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1220 (1999). I suppose what I am saying here is that by calling 
some lawyers whores I do not intend to insult prostitutes by association. 
58. See supra note 43. 
59. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 940-41; Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 
19, at 723; Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 558. 
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understanding of moral deliberation were better?60 There is no doubt 
that the legal profession and graduate educational institutions fre-
quendy assume an affirmative answer to that question. Consider a 
prominent manifestation of this proposition. In 1987, with the insider 
trading and junk bond scandals involving colorful figures like Ivan 
Boesky and Michael Milken firmly in mind, then-Securities and Ex-
change Commission Chair John Shad donated $20 million to Harvard 
Business School for business ethics education.61 "I've been very dis-
turbed by the great number of leading business and law school gradu-
ates becoming felons," Shad said at the time of his gift.62 Harvard 
Business School, which we probably should assume did not take the 
money from Shad while convinced that such training was a waste of 
time and resources, either led, or was carried along by, a trend in that 
era on the part of business schools to emphasize social responsibility 
concerns amid its more conventional profit maximization training.63 
Similar sentiments have driven ethics education in law school. 
The 1970s Watergate scandals apparendy prompted law schools to re-
quire professional responsibility in their curriculum.64 The fact that 
institutions respond to reports of troublesome behavior with recom-
mendations to teach about ethics does not mean, obviously, that the 
suggested cure has any connection to the purported disease. There is 
an open invitation to skepticism here, heard from time to time in the 
literature.65 Did John Shad really believe that Ivan Boesky's criminal 
60. See Clark, supra note 19, at 677 (asking this question and suggesting a qualified 
affirmative answer); Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 739 (the same). 
61. Robert Lenzner, SEC Chairman to Donate $20 Million to Harvard for Business Ethics 
Program, THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 31, 1987, available at 1987 WL 3970954. 
62. [d. 
63. See Business Schools' Assignment: Think About Ethical Questions, Associated Press, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1988 (reporting on efforts at Harvard Business School, University of 
Pennsylvania's Wharton School, Columbia University, and University of Virginia to en-
hance ethics instruction). This agenda has its advocates in law school business education. 
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, There's a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching about the Role of Cmporations 
in Society, 34 GA. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (2000) (advocating an increased emphasis on stake-
holder interests and corporate social responsibility in law school business courses). 
64. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 673; Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, 
at 722; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 
2 (1975). 
65. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Wanted: An Ethos of Personal Responsibility-Why 
Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for Ethical Lawyers, 21 CONN. L. REv. 365, 365-82 
(1989); James E. Moliterno, In-House Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67 
FORDHAM L. REv. 2377, 2386-87 (1999);James W. Perkins, Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH. 
LAw. 185, 195-96 (1998). 
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activities66 were the result of inadequate instruction in business school 
c1asses?67 It does seem fair to draw a distinction between brazenly ille-
gal behavior and worrisome but borderline unethical behavior,68 and 
it then seems not a little naive to suggest that felons and law breakers 
just need a good dose of compulsory chape1.69 
But this pot shot may be misplaced. Briefly stated, the response 
goes something like this: It must be that the cretins we so dislike ei-
ther mean to do well but just screw up (in which case better training 
just might help), or they really don't mean to do well in the first place, 
which is to say they are sociopathic (in which case better training is 
less likely to have any effect, unless ethics training can motivate the 
sociopaths) . 
But here's the difficulty. It may be true that the felons, the 
whores, and the jerks are at bottom uninterested in considerations of 
fairness, justice, or what might be "the good." It may be true that, if a 
critic were to buttonhole one of these folks, the lawyer would answer 
the critic's complaints with something to the effect of "Sorry, bub. I 
agree with you about the injustice, the unfairness, and the cruelty of 
what I do, but I simply don't give a flying fig. I just do not care." But I'll 
bet, and you'll likely agree, that the critics are not going to hear such 
words from those lawyers.7o When buttonholed, those lawyers will de-
66. Boesky pled guilty to one felony count for securities fraud. See JAMES B. STEWART, 
DEN OF THIEVES 420 (1992); Omri Yadlin, Is Stock Manipulation Bad? Questioning The Conven-
tional Wisdom With Evidence From The Israeli Experience, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 839, 840 
(2001) . 
67. Actually, the fact that Shad worried about too many HaIvard Business School 
graduates becoming "felons" might imply some belief in that proposition-that somehow 
criminal (as opposed to unethical) behaviors might be deterred by better ethics instruction. 
See Lenzner, supra note 6l. 
68. John Dean is reported to have made that distinction after Watergate: "I knew that 
the things I was doing were wrong, and one learns the difference between right and wrong 
long before one enters law school. A course in legal ethics wouldn't have changed any-
thing." D. Goldman, "Exclusive Interview with John Dean," Comment, Boston University 
School of Law 1 (1979), quoted in Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 602 
n.243. 
69. See Deborah L. Rhode, Proftssionalism in Professional Schools, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 
193, 195 (1999) (responding to the charge that" [sl tudents either have it or they don't, and 
postgraduate training is an empty proposition. As Eric Schnapper once put it, legal ethics 
'like politeness on subways ... and fidelity in marriage' cannot be acquired through class-
room moralizing," quoting Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1978, at 
202,205. 
70. See Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 601 (lawyers asked about 
questionable conduct "did not say, 'Yeah, I'm a whore. I'm only in it for the money.' The 
justifications they offered related to considerations of justice, fairness, political legitimacy, 
and loyalty to clients .... "). See also Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. 
L. REv. 333, 338 (2001) ("Most individuals want to perceive themselves and be perceived by 
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fend what they did with arguments, whether persuasive or not, that 
connect to shared norms within the profession. 
The obvious response by the skeptics at this point is: ''OJ course! 
But can't you see that these felons, whores, and jerks are lyinlf. 
They're sociopaths, after all, so they'd hardly worry about lying." We 
have to accept that explanation as entirely possible. It is easy for soci-
opaths to pretend that they are not sociopaths, and given some of the 
strained arguments the critics might hear, the suspicions about dis-
sembling might be rather high. But this need to dissemble is telling 
for two reasons. First, and perhaps less interesting, this reality means 
that the critics, and the teachers, will never be able confidently to 
identify the sociopaths. They will look very much like the good faith 
but stumbling lawyer who just gets it wrong, and offers weak argu-
ments because his skill at this deliberative reasoning stuff is not so 
great. Second, and more interesting it seems, the very need of the 
felons, whores, and jerks to dissemble with arguments communicates 
something about the nature of community norms and their effect on 
behavior. Rambo doesn't need to lie, so why would he do so? He may 
be willing to act like a sociopath, but it's very hard for him to admit 
being a sociopath, because his community of peers will not accept that 
level of immorality. 
We return to this question in Part IV of this Article. In that Part 
we explore further the various guises under which the felons, whores, 
and jerks might appear, in an effort to discern whether professional 
schools, or professional trade associations, might play some role in 
influencing their behaviors.71 For the next two Parts we return to the 
realm of moral deliberation, assuming here that the audience cares 
about doing this ethics stuff right. 
ll. Deliberation About Values 
Let us assume, for the next two Parts, that law students and law-
yers are likely motivated to be as good as they can be, all things consid-
others as being motivated by moral values like generosity, honor and honesty and not just 
by the prospect of material gain."). Rob Atkinson may disagree. He argues that "unscrupu-
lous Type 1 [hired gun, or 'Rambo'] lawyers ... do notjustity their Type 1 behavior by 
even a self-serving reference to dubious theories; they do not try to justity it at all." Atkin-
son, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 306. His reference for this statement, however, 
offers only "an exception that proves the rule." [d. at n.202 (recounting a Skadden Arps 
lawyer'S claim that ''I'm at Skadden now. We pride ourselves on being assholes. It's part of 
the firm culture," quoting LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A 
LEGAL EMPIRE 241 (1993». 
71. See text accompanying infra notes 217-37. 
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ered.72 It is possible, I suppose, that simply by wanting to be as good as 
she can be, an individual can be trusted to make reliable, centered, 
and correct moral choices-but that supposition is unlikely. We would 
suppose, instead, that good faith persons can learn how to deliberate 
better, in order to make superior moral choices,73 and that they ought 
to study how to do so. At this juncture, though, some difficulties ap-
pear. There seems to be consensus among writers in this area that 
students and lawyers ought to learn an art often described as "deliber-
ative (or reflective) judgment"-that is, how to recognize moral ques-
tions, how to parse their components, and how to weigh important 
moral considerations in context.74 Seldom, though, is the suggestion 
made that students and lawyers can learn some right answers, or how 
to balance appropriately competing claims about what might be right. 
Teaching a sense of reflective judgment is viewed as an altogether 
good thing; teaching specific values, by contrast, is worrisome.75 Cer-
tain nagging doubts about personal values, about moral pluralism, 
and about one's ethical identity seem to predominate. "There are no 
right or wrong answers," one frequently hears, "but there are better or 
worse answers."76 The critique continues, if values are to be taught, 
"whose values" will those be?77 
In this Part we examine some of the underlying sources for the 
doubts about identifying, and working from, shared values. I conclude 
72. See SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD: AN INTRODucnON TO ETHICS 7 (2000) (noting 
the difference between "moralists" and ordinary persons who may not always be perfectly 
good). 
73. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 676; Feldman, supra note 5, at 941. 
74. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 15-16 (1993); Paul Brest & Linda Kreiger, On Teaching ProfessionalJudgment, 69 
WASH. L. REv. 527 (1994); Clark, supra note 19, at 676; Feldman, supra note 5, at 904-05; 
Gutmann, supra note 23, at 1765; Luban & Millemann, supra note 20, at 39. See also Alexan-
der Scherr, Lawyers And Decisions: A Model Of PracticalJudgment, 47 VILL. L. REv. 161 (2002) 
(developing a model of judgment for lawyering tasks generally). 
75. Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of 
Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 76 (1991) ("[Ilt seems inappropri-
ate for law schools to promote particular values. To do so would be to assume that values 
are universal or that those embodied in the professional role are uncontroversial."); Lee 
Modjeska, On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 71, 73 (1991) (teach-
ing morality "raises the specter of moral pontification .... Law teaching ... is not a bully 
pulpit."). 
76. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS By THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD 15 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter RHODE, ETHICS By THE PERVASIVE METHOD 1; Clark, 
supra note 19, at 675-76. 
77. See WHOSE VALUES? THE BATTLE FOR MORALITY IN PLURALISTIC AMERICA 2 (Carl 
Horn ed., 1985). Cf Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech 
Clause with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 769, 777 
(1995) ("Whose values should be taught?"). 
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that, unless one accepts a relativist or subjectivist perspective about 
values-a position with few real world defenders-the prevailing con-
ception of non-comparable, personal values is an unwarranted one. 
A. The Relativism Worry 
The first, and perhaps the least troublesome, objection comes 
from the relativists. When the topic turns to questions of value a stu-
dent might object: "I'm sorry, but how can we talk about values here? 
My values may be very different from your values, and nothing we can 
say here can persuade me that you are right and I am wrong. Let's talk 
about law, which we can study, but not values, which are only in our 
heads."78 
This is hardly the place for an in-depth exploration of the relativ-
ism controversy, which has engaged scholars for centuries.79 For our 
purposes, it suffices to note that the crude relativism argument just 
presented, which Bernard Williams calls "vulgar relativism,"80 is either 
incoherent, or irrelevant. Its incoherence stems from its implicit ex-
pression of reasons (I will act this way because my individual values 
support such action) while denying, at the same moment, that those 
reasons have any intersubjective validity. If the relativist's values serve 
as a basis for acting (and what else would they do?), the values imply 
some form of shared norms which give the reasons some substance.81 
If, on the other hand, the relativist denies this apparent truth, then 
her position is irrelevant. It is irrelevant both because no conversation 
with her will have any purpose, and because, frankly, she doesn't ex-
ist.82 Even the most passionate defender of the "it's my opinion" argu-
ment will have reasons for her opinion, and once there are reasons, 
there are arguments, and efforts to make others understand why the 
78. This argument is not one presented by relativist scholars, but it is one sometimes 
heard among plain persons, including law students and lawyers. SeeJeremy Waldron, On the 
Objectivity of Morals: Thoughts on Gilhert's Democratic Individuality, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1361, 
1373-74 (1992) [hereinafter Waldron, Objectivity of Morals] ("Although relativism appears 
to be a very popular position among non philosophers, it is notoriously difficult to formu-
late in philosophically rigorous terms."). 
79. See, e.g., DAVlD WONG, MORAL RELATIVI'IY (1984). The most serious recent defense 
of a form of relativism appears in the work of neo-pragmatists. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Almost 
Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMA-
TISM IN LAw & SOCIE'IY 47 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). For a critique of 
the relativism emanating from pragmatism and some strains of postmodernism, see Eric 
Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REv. 523 (1996). 
80. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 159, 219 n.2 (1985). 
81. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 27-29. 
82. Cf Blumenson, supra note 79, at 541 n.58 (arguing the incoherence of a relativist 
reasoning process). 
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reasons make sense, and then something other than relativism is go-
ing on.83 
There is a more credible version of relativism which I should note 
in passing but which need not concern us here. A much more serious 
debate grapples with the prospect of cultural relativism and "univer-
salizability" of moral judgments. Richard Posner, for instance, has ar-
gued that "[iJ nfanticide is abhorred in our culture, but routine in 
societies that lack the resources to feed all the children that are 
born."84 He thus concludes that infanticide is not necessarily "wrong" 
in any absolute sense. Many writers, like Posner, wonder whether all 
deeply held notions of the good are culturally driven, and question 
whether one can justifiably critique a different culture for practices 
accepted as immoral here.85 Those arguments, even if persuasive, 
have little place in the debates within the legal profession about how 
lawyers may act honorably. The cultural relativism arguments seem to 
assume strong norms within one culture, and question the applicabil-
ity of those norms elsewhere. Those arguments in this way tend to 
support the positions developed here, which look for common, 
shared norms among those who worry about lawyers' ethics. 
Another reason to minimize relativism as a serious worry for pro-
fessional ethics conversations is that even avowed relativists tend to 
join in common discourse when the topic comes around to the most 
glaring cruelties or injustices. For instance, even the envelope-pushing 
Judge Posner, a prominent defender of a deep version of relativism, 
seems unable to sustain his relativist thesis when confronted with com-
pelling, real tragedy.86 
83. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 28. 
84. Posner, Problematics, supra note 7, at 1650. Posner would "hesitate to 
call ... immoral ... a person who sincerely claimed, with or without supporting argu-
ments, that it is right to kill infants ... ." [d. at 1644. 
85. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND 
ABROAD (1996). For responses to those arguments, see WILLIAMS, supra note 80; Blumen-
son, supra note 79. 
86. A few years after his Holmes Lectures in which he defended infanticide and slav-
ery as not necessarily morally wrong given the right local community norms, see supra note 
7, Posner demonstrated the real challenge in adhering to a relativist (or subjectivist) 
stance. In a recent column in The Atlantic Monthly, Posner quotes an American historian 
and offers his response to the historian's views: 
[The historian writes:] "I'm not sure which is more frightening: the horror that 
engulfed New York City [on September 11, 2001] or the apocalyptic rhetoric ema-
nating daily from the White House." Come again? Can this really be a difficult 
choice? One is reminded of Martin Heidigger's saying that although the extermi-
nation of the Jews was bad, so is mechanized agriculture. 
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B. The Role of Faith 
If relativism falls short as an intellectual objection to values talk 
within professional education, arguments grounded in religious faith 
are equally beside the point. This is not to assert, of course, that the 
role of faith is not considerable in its influence on many lawyers' and 
students' views of morality.87 Any such claim would be just silly. But 
arguments based on faith can never be persuasive to those who do not 
share the proponent's religious beliefs;88 faith based arguments are 
persuasive when they reach a shared core of sentiment about what is 
to be valued. Those who argue that, for instance, Jesuit education of-
fers a more sustained moral vision than secular education89 may well 
be right, but the moral values taught by Jesuit or Catholic institutions 
are profound and meaningful not because they are Jesuit or Catholic, 
but because they are profound and meaningful. 
A religious ethicist does not make the argument that her beliefs 
are good simply because they are her beliefs as propounded from on 
high.90 A purely scriptural argument is one we simply will not hear: 
I don't care what you say to me about, and indeed I accept your 
arguments about, cruelty, unfairness, disrespect, inequality, and 
the like-I value "X," notwithstanding its cruelty and injustice, be-
cause my God tells me I must value "X," and what my God tells me 
is absolute truth to me and binding on me. 
As Simon Blackburn writes, "The point is that God, or the gods, are 
not to be thought of as arbitrary. They have to be regarded as selecting 
Richard A. Posner, The Professors Profess, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, February 2002, at 28 (quoting 
Eric Foner). There is no question that Posner's disagreement with Foner (and his use of 
the Heidigger story) is a normative one, and Posner uses arguments in an effort to persuade 
his readers that on the normative question he is assuredly right-that it is worse, morally, 
to kill 3000 innocent civilians by crashing airplanes into two skyscrapers than to engage in 
apocalyptic rhetoric about evil and war. This is moral argument, pure and simple, by a self-
proclaimed relativist. See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 1787 (" [I]s Posner really a relativist at 
all?") . 
87. See, e.g., Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1253 (1998); Monroe H. Freedman, Religion is Not Totally Irrelevant to 
Legal Ethics, 66 FORDI-IAM L. REv. 1299 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics andJurupru-
dencefrom within Religious Congregations 33 U. ToL. L. REv. 91 (2001). 
88. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 10. 
89. See Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the Dean in an 
Inclusive Catholic Law School 33 U. ToL. L. REv. 171, 188 (2001) ("realization of Catholic 
identity can indeed be one such antidote" to "anomie"). CJ. Mack A. Player, Stranger In a 
Strange Land: Baptist Dean of a Jesuit Law School, 33 U. ToL. L. REv. 143, 145 (2001) 
(stressing the Jesuit values of service and commitment to justice). 
90. Simon Blackburn offers an example from Plato's Dialogues to make this point. 
Socrates develops the circularity of Euthyphro's argument that "[piety] is loved because it 
is holy, not holy because it is loved." BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 15-16. 
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the right things to allow and to forbid."91 The important question, for 
religious as well as non-religious professionals, is discerning what 
those "right" things are.92 
c. The Role of "Personal" Values 
Few respected applied ethics writers defend a deeply relativist 
stance, as we have seen.93 A purely subjectivist stance has even less cur-
rency.94 So it does not surprise us that we seldom, if ever, hear argu-
ments like this: 
I happen to believe deeply that it is entirely right for a lawyer to 
bribe a judge, forge documents, and offer perjured testimony on 
behalf of a wealthy corporate client in order to win an entirely 
trumped-up foreclosure case against a working class family with 
sick children and nowhere else to live. Just my opinion.95 
By contrast, many respected applied ethics writers treat moral val-
ues as somehow "personal,"96 and suggest limits on their role within 
professional education. William Simon, for instance, disparages the 
role that "private or personal moralities of individual lawyers" ought 
to play in ethical decisionmaking.97 Bruce Green cautions lawyers not 
to allow their personal values to influence their professional deci-
91. Id. at 16. 
92. For an example of this point, see Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish 
Perspective, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1131 (1994). Freedman writes that his legal ethics are 
influenced by his Jewish traditions and their commitment to "the dignity and sanctity of 
the individual, compassion for fellow human beings, individual autonomy, and equal pro-
tection of the laws." Id. at 1134. Freedman's list is evocative and compelling, and there is 
little doubt that these sentiments are central in his Jewish tradition, but the goods he lists 
are hardly idiosyncratic. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any community, offaith or otherwise, 
not committed to those values. 
93. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
94. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 7, at 1642-43 (defending a version of relativism 
but denying that his arguments are subjectivist). 
95. Note that we may hear arguments from a lawyer who represents a wealthy corpora-
tion foreclosing on a working class family with sick children and nowhere else to live, de-
fending that representation. Those arguments, though, will rely on some reasons, some 
principles, and some shared concepts and norms, however contestable in the circum-
stances of the particular case. See Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Maral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 573 (1977) (offering a reasoned, principled defense of 
zealous advocacy). 
96. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Private Lives and Professional Responsibilities? The Rela-
tionship of Personal Marality to Lawyering and Professional Ethics, 21 PACE L. REv. 365, 373 
(2001). 
97. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, supra note 20, at 65-66. See William H. Simon, 
Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988); Simon's thesis is that lawyers 
possess no common analytical and rhetorical tools for addressing personal values. See SI-
MON, THE PRAcrICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18. 
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sions.98 A similar recognition of the personal nature of moral commit-
ment is reflected in the frequent observation about the "moral 
diversity" of the legal profession and the absence of shared values 
among lawyers.99 Rob Atkinson criticizes as "demonstrably erroneous 
... [the] premise that conscientious lawyers agree on the way to be a 
good person and a good lawyer, or that a single kind of lawyering is 
right and all others wrong,"100 a thesis that Atkinson labels "the fallacy 
of the one true way."101 
The notion of "personal" values, either as a basis for lawyering 
commitments102 or as an impermissible distortion of those commit-
ments,103 engenders the same incoherence that surrounded the rela-
tivist arguments. A claim that values are personal implies that they are 
somehow non-negotiable, that they are not based upon reasons or ar-
guments, but just "are." That kind of offering is justly rejected when 
proffered by a relativist. Why does it have such currency and validity 
here? There is some good reason for the difference, but to under-
stand that reason we must distinguish among three versions of "per-
sonal" values. With an appreciation of these distinctions, we see that 
some values are "personal" in the non-negotiable way, but others are 
not. 
1. Values As Reasoning About What Is Right 
A common understanding of one's personal values treats those 
concepts as beliefs about what might be correct from a moral stand-
point.104 Such beliefs cannot be idiosyncratic without our relying on 
98. See Green, supra note 4, at 19. See also Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 14, at 1298 
(criticizing a suggestion by some ethicists, including Geoffrey Hazard, that "[a] lawyer can 
resort to her own idiosyncratic values to draw the line at which partisanship leaves off and 
exogenous norms take hold"). Rostain argues that "Hazard ends up in a 'lonely subjective 
world' of inchoate personal value," citing Hazard, Personal Values, supra note 4, at 141. 
99. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 268, citing Timothy P. Terrell & 
James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism, "41 EMORyLJ, 403, 432 (1992). See also Rob-
ert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal 
Profession, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACfICES 14 (D. Trubek et al. eds., 1993) (the 
professionalism campaigns rely on "vague and general invocation of 'shared' values that 
really aren't shared"); Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 
13 (1990) [hereinafter Schneyer, Hired Gun] (most lawyers' "personal values" are not the 
same as the "progressive political values" of critics like David Luban). 
100. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 303. 
101. [d. 
102. See Swygert, supra note 14, at 807-08,813-14. 
103. See Green, supra note 4. 
104. See Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 15 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 37,49-50 (2001); Scherr, supra note 
74, at 194. 
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subjectivist or religious arguments, and hence do not warrant the pro-
tective label of "personal." Imagine: I claim that my "personal" values 
forbid me from lying to gain an advantage in a particular context, the 
details of which you and I understand equally well.105 You respond 
that your "personal" values permit you to lie in that identical circum-
stance. Assuming that you and I reject dogmatic relativism or subjec-
tivism ("it's my opinion because, well, because it's my opinion") as 
well as purely religious foundations for our stances ("it's my opinion 
because my dogma says so, and I can't offer any other reasons"), our 
values are negotiable. I offer my nuanced reasons why lying is wrong 
in this case (not always wrong, perhaps, but wrong here); you respond 
with your nuanced arguments in support of the lie here. We might 
call our values personal, but we gain very little in doing so. They cer-
tainly gain no protection from critique or debate by that label, nor am 
lout of bounds by concluding (and teaching, if I am your teacher) that 
your value is ill-reasoned and, well, wrong, at least in this context.106 
Bruce Green has articulated the most robust defense of a distinc-
tion between personal values and professional values, arguing that the 
former ought to be cabined in professional decisionmaking.107 His ar-
guments, though, are not persuasive. His thesis is most provocative 
when he imagines professionals holding idiosyncratic personal values 
and applying those values in an unacceptable way. For instance, he 
asks us to imagine ajudge, assigned to hear a visitation dispute involv-
ing an abusive father, calling upon his "personal belief that divorce is 
immoral, as well as a religious conviction that children should respect 
and revere their parents" to decide that the son should visit the father, 
even though "two independent psychiatrists believe that the children 
would be harmed" by the visitation. lOS 
Green's point is that the judge should not rely on these beliefs 
because they are personal and religious. He is correct that the judge 
should not rely on these beliefs, but not because of their source. In-
105. The qualification that we understand the context of the value choice at hand is 
critical. See text accompanying infra note 171. 
106. My argument addresses the moral assessment of your conduct, and not the legal 
assessment. William Simon may be right that the latter is often more workable, and exhib-
its clearer shared norms, than the former, and my example here is one such instance. See 
SIMON, THE PRACfICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18. It is plainly unlawful for you as a 
lawyer to lie, and my argument on that score will employ a truly shared authority, like 
MODEL RULES PROF'L CONOUCf, R. 3.3, 4.1 and 8.4(c) (2002), if they happen to have been 
adopted in our jurisdiction. My larger point is that, the facility of the legal arguments 
notwithstanding, the same reasoning often applies to moral questions. 
107. See Green, supra note 4. 
108. [d. at 31-32. 
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stead, the judge should be faulted because his moral reasoning is sim-
ply wrong. Green's analysis is subtly, but insistently, relativist or 
subjectivist. He affords the judge autonomy in his choice of values, 
without offering a reasoned challenge to the acceptability of the val-
ues expressed by the judge. I09 His thesis implies that we cannot evalu-
ate the acceptability of personal values, and, therefore, the safe route 
is to adhere to collective professional values. The opposing thesis de-
veloped here is that we can reason through questions of value and 
conclude, like we will in his example, that certain decisions are simply 
wrong. 110 
2. Values As Reasons for Acting, Apart from Considerations About 
What Is Right 
The notion of personal values might mean something rather dif-
ferent, however, from an opinion about what is right morally. The 
literature about autonomy and individual choice relies often on the 
accepted understanding that individuals differ in their personal val-
ues.II l In this context the term "values" refers to deep preferences, or, 
as David Luban has written, "reasons for acting ... that form the core 
109. Green credits personal and religious norms as critical to a person's identity, see id 
at 34, but understands those norms as idiosyncratic and, hence, not subject to reasoned 
analysis. See id. at 23 ("unique individual moral codes"); id. at 24 ("subjective religious and 
personal moral dispositions," quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Equal opportunity in the Practice of 
Law, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 127, 128 (1990». 
110. Green offers several examples to establish his claim that the indiscriminate appli-
cation of private, idiosyncratic norms is unwise. In the most provocative examples, not 
surprisingly, the personal value choices conflict with the disposition offered by the profes-
sion's guidelines. (If there were no clash, we would not know that the actor had acted on 
personal norms; and if the professional guidelines did not require a particular resolution 
or limited set of options, the choice made would be essentially unfettered.) In each case 
where the exercise of a supposed personal value led to an injustice, see id., Examples 3, at 
31-32; 4, at 36; and 7, at 41, the critique in the text would apply-the injustice ought to be 
avoided because it is unjust, not because of its connection to personal values. In the cases 
where adherence to the professional guidelines might seem unjust, see id., Examples 2, at 
30-31; and 10, at 54-55, Green's argument is even more difficult to sustain. Perhaps it is 
best to allow certain injustices to occur in the interests of developing fidelity to rules, but 
that conclusion would follow from a careful analysis of the rule and the circumstances, and 
should not be decided because one value is deemed professional and another personal. Cf 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (child's life endangered when 
lawyers adhered to confidentiality rules and did not disclose aneurysm to child). 
111. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 18; ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. 
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING COUNSEUNG & NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECfIVE REPRESENTA· 
TION (1990); ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE AP-
PROACH TO CUENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEUNG (1999); David Luban, Paternalism and the 
Legal Profession, 1981 WISC. L. REv. 454 [hereinafter Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profes-
sion]; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to Representing Se-
nior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1073 (1994);Jan Ellen Rein, Clients 
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of [one's] personality."Il2 Using this view of the term "values," we have 
little difficulty agreeing that they are idiosyncratic, non-negotiable 
(for the most part), and "personal." But it is equally apparent that this 
conception of values is different from the conception of values as sen-
timents about what is right. You might declare that your deep prefer-
ence is to lie to gain an advantage in the case we are discussing. I am 
powerless to persuade you that your preference is wrong as a statement 
of your reasons for acting. I am not powerless or unjustified, by contrast, 
in trying to persuade you that your choice is wrong as a question of 
ethics.113 
3. Values As Patterns of Response to Incommensurability 
The third conception of "personal" values offers an understand-
ing of personal normative commitments which does not presuppose 
relativism or subjectivism but which may demand respect for idiosyn-
crasy and non-negotiable stances. This conception thus combines ele-
ments of the first two, and might support, in some settings, the 
commentators' recognition of a strong diversity of moral opinions 
within the legal profession. 
We saw above, in discussing the first conception of personal val-
ues, that questions of right and wrong invite reason-giving, and hence 
build upon a shared language and shared beliefs about normative 
value. Bradley Wendel has recently explored the nature of normative 
disagreement in light of the weakness of relativist arguments, and he 
offers the ideas of incommensurability and incomparability as central com-
ponents of moral uncertainty and conflict. 1 14 Two nonrelativists ought 
to agree generally about common core values, at least in the ab-
stract.115 If multiple shared norms conflict (as they will in any instance 
with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What s an Attorney To Do?: Within and Beyond the 
Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. IlOl (1994). 
ll2. Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, supra note Ill, at 470. 
113. This understanding of "personal values" seems to mesh with the use of that phrase 
to represent private behaviors which mayor may not affect one's professional duties. See 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 96, at 369-70, 389-91 (comparing President Clinton's less 
than admirable private moral conduct with his professional obligations). 
114. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 143. See also KRONMAN, supra note 74, 
at Il4-15 (the incommensurability of norms is a conception taught to law students, con-
trary to their pre-law school understanding). 
ll5. See WALZER, supra note 85, at 1-19 (arguing that agreement in the abstract is of 
very little use in moral and political disputes; "thin" descriptions might offer seeming 
agreement about principles, but more complex "thick" descriptions, where several valued 
principles clash, undercut any earlier agreement). 
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of moral uncertaintyI16), the two conversants might still agree about 
how the conflicting norms ought to be weighed or ranked,1l7 but only 
if they first concur about some "covering value" which might serve as 
the basis for the comparison. I IS In many instances of moral uncer-
tainty, Wendel asserts, no such covering values can be found. Indeed, 
the disagreement may well be itself about two plausible covering 
values.II 9 
Wendel offers a "thick" example involving a dispute over whether 
to develop a copper mine within the Glacier Peak Wilderness in Wash-
ington's Cascade range.120 He argues that the choice between devel-
oping the mine and leaving the Wilderness pristine implicates serious 
moral concerns about which observers will disagree. The disagree-
ments will not be ones of mere "opinion," for the arguments about 
which side is right will rely on reason, on facts, and on common 
norms which both sides accept. The difficulty, Wendel shows, is that 
when the debate is exhausted the "better" answer depends on how 
one ranks the two goods (economic values and jobs versus breathtak-
ing beauty), and on that score no "reason" will suffice to persuade 
another.121 
In the "tragic" instances of incomparability and an inability to de-
fine an adequate covering value, Wendel argues, the actor cannot rely 
on reasoning alone, and must instead rely on his personal commit-
ments, his character, and his life story to make the best choice he can, 
all things considered.I22 Having done so, he will not (Wendel implies) 
be criticized by us, or ought not be, for we cannot say that he is wrong 
116. SeeJoNsEN & TOULMIN, supra note 8, at 330. 
117. Most moral philosophers reject the idea of an ex ante lexical ordering of principles 
or norms. W. D. Ross proposed a ranked order of duties, arguing that the principle of 
nonmalevolence (avoiding harm) ought to take precedence over the principle of benefi-
cence (the production of good consequences). See Ross, supra note 6, at 21-22. Few philos-
ophers believe that the lexical ordering endeavor is a fruitful one. See Wendel, Value 
Pluralism, supra note 34, at 139-41; Kai Nelson, On Being Skeptical About Applied Ethics, in 
CLINICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: EXPLORATION AND AsSESSMENT 95 (Terrance F. Ackerman et al. 
eds., 1987); Alasdair MacIntyre, Moral Philosophy: What's Next?, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PER-
SPECriVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPI-N I, 5 (Alasdair MacIntyre & Stanley Hauerwas eds., 1983) 
("there are no scales" for the weighing of competing values). 
118. Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 152 ("The possibility or impossibility of 
making comparisons is intelligible only if there is some covering value in respect to which 
the intrinsic merit of two items may be evaluated."). 
119. See id. at 153. 
120. See id. at 154-57. 
121. See id. at 159 ("The point of the example is that it seems impossible to specifY a 
covering value that takes into account the full range of moral and prudential considera-
tions at play in the policy dispute and tells us how they should be ranked."). 
122. See id. at 160-61. 
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(or that we know that he is wrong). That limit on criticism, if we ac-
cept it, might leave the observers of the present state of affairs of the 
legal profession a bit more humble in their censure. We reach that 
question at the end of this Article.123 
The recognition of incommensurable or incomparable norms of-
fers support for the commentators who cabin the "personal" values 
from the arena of reasoned argument. At the same time, it is impor-
tant not to overstate the significance of this phenomenon. Some of 
the more skeptical observers imply that all moral reasoning falls into 
this incomparability camp,124 and that conclusion is seemingly mis-
taken. Further, in cases of true incomparability, and perhaps Wendel's 
National Wilderness mining story meets that definition, important 
reasoning and argument may proceed on the legal values at stake, so 
that the lawyer need not see the choice as one which he must make 
entirely on his own. 125 As we shall see in the next Part, some tech-
niques of moral reasoning, particularly casuistry, can minimize the fre-
quency that moral conflicts end up with true conversation-stopping 
incomparability. 
ill. Working with, and from, Shared Norms 
An important aim of this Article is to question the common un-
derstanding that values are idiosyncratic and non-negotiable. Dis-
agreements which appear to arise from irresolvable conflicts between 
different individuals' personal values can often be reframed as dis-
agreements about facts. 126 The deep seated disputes reported as evi-
dence of "culture wars"127 are genuine controversies, but not always, 
123. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. 
124. See, e.g., SIMON, THE PRACfICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18 (moral values lack-
ing analytical and rhetorical foundation); Green, supra note 4, at 21 (personal values are 
separate from professional values). 
125. This argument is reminiscent of Bruce Green's objection to lawyers using per-
sonal values in legal ethics contexts. See Green, supra note 4, at 56-57. The problem with 
Green's argument is that he applies it to a much larger class of moral questions, and not 
(seemingly) just to the incomparability exceptions, which may be rather scarce. The reli-
ance on legal norms is also the position defended by William Simon. See SIMON, THE PRAC-
TICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 138-39; William H. Simon, Moral Pluck, 101 COLUM. L. 
REv. 421, 439 (2001). 
126. See Waldron, Objectivity of Morals, supra note 78, at 1374 ("In real-life ethical con-
frontations, people entangle their moral claims with factual propositions about human 
nature and the world. They deliberately open up the former to the latter, sometimes hold-
ing themselves prepared to abandon or modify a moral position if the facts turn out to be 
different."). 
127. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERJCA 
(1991); A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note 12, at 13. 
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or even often, about values. The reasons given in defense of positions 
on the death penalty, or divorce, or gun control, or gay marriage, or 
even abortion tend to assert factual premises, or predictions about fu-
ture harms or benefits.128 (Faith-based arguments are also prevalent, 
but those arguments are not persuasive as a justification for a moral 
position, as we saw earlier.129) The differences of opinion seldom, by 
contrast, hinge on definitions about what is "good." 
In this Part, I address one attractive possibility for working with 
agreement, one that builds upon the classical and traditional moral 
theories. I suggest that using theory as a way to work from common 
sentiments is problematic at a practical level. I then describe a more 
promising method of ethical reasoning, casuiStry,130 which employs 
agreement as a starting point and a focus for moral assessment. I end 
this Part with a review of sociological work which offers evidence of 
the shared norms upon which casuists rely. 
A. Moral Theory and Its Limits 
A seemingly promising way to advance conversations about ethics 
from the realm of personal opinion and preferences to a more sub-
stantive reasoned plane is through the use of moral theory. Imagine 
again a common ethical disagreement in a law school or law practice 
setting: You defend deceiving your opponent in a negotiation about a 
material fact, and I disapprove of your choice. Our disagreement is 
rather fruitless if we remain at an ad hominum level, so perhaps we 
ought to move to a careful consideration of moral theory. If we apply 
the more prominent moral theories to our disagreement, we may 
reach some common understanding of the moral principles involved, 
and perhaps we may even agree about a resolution to our debate. At a 
minimum, moral theory grounds our conversation in a way that our 
expressing our strong personal opinions does not. 
Many observers make this kind of suggestion. 131 Not surprisingly, 
the most common advice urges the study of the two historically most 
128. This thesis is explored in the context of a review of Alan Wolfe's sociological stud-
ies on American values. See infra notes 174-207 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
130. One of the leading casuist writers denies that this process should be seen as a 
"methodology," fearing that such a word implies too formal an idea. See Albert R. Jonsen, 
Casuistry: An Alternative ur Complement to Principles?, 5 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 237, 241 
(1995) [hereinafter Jonsen, Alternative ur Complement]. 
131. Many standard professional responsibility textbooks introduce moral theory in an 
early chapter, implicitly or explicitly in order to aid students to understand better the 
moral issues they will confront in the course and in their practices. See, e.g., RHODE, ETHICS 
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prominent theories, utilitarianism and deontology,132 although other 
kinds of moral theories, including the conception of virtue ethics, find 
their way into texts about professional ethics deliberation.133 The 
more one understands about moral philosophy, the better prepared 
one will be to confront "the intractability of moral dilemma: moments 
of crisis when, viewed honestly, the paths of right and wrong conduct 
do not clearly stretch out from one's feet."134 Some scholars explicitly 
urge greater study by law students of '''metaethics,' or the study of 
value systems."135 
These moral theory proposals make much good sense, but they 
are blemished by some deep problems. I do not pretend to discount 
the value of exploring the rich philosophical traditions that underpin 
modern moral discourse. Far be it from me to minimize the brilliance 
of the elaborate theories of moral reasoning offered by Kant,136 or the 
intricate efforts of the consequentialists to respond to the admittedly 
dogmatic elements of Kantian theory.137 My several concerns run in 
the opposite direction, and actually grow out of the sophistication 
needed to join these philosophical debates. 
My worries are three. First, those who introduce competing moral 
theories to young professionals in training do so in order to offer a 
choice among several orientations. 138 The implication is that one "opts 
in" at some stage of her professional development and makes moral 
choices based on the resulting decisional path. 139 (This suggestion in-
BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 11-32; MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., 
PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 4-27 (5th ed. 2001). 
132. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 131, at 6-17,20-27. The same advice appears in 
applied ethics sources in medicine, again not surprisingly. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHIL-
DRESS, supra note 50, at 47-62. 
133. See RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 19; BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 62-69. 
134. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 71 (1986). 
135. Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative Core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons 
from the "Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY LJ. 87, 88 (2000). 
136. See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 324-25 (2000) 
(praise for Kant); Jeremy Waldron, A Life on Their Own, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 599 (2002) (re-
viewing RAWLS). 
137. See, e.g.,John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theury of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARI-
ANISM AND BEYOND 39, 44-46 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982);JJ.C. Smart, 
An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 26 aJ.C. 
Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). 
138. See, e.g., RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 13, 27-32; 
Terrell, supra note 135, at 113 ("distiguish[ingl between two subtle approaches to choosing 
one's values"). 
139. See Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 501-02 (developing this 
argument). 
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cludes the accompanying implication that one would make different 
choices depending on where one lands. 140) There exists a serious ques-
tion whether law students and lawyers have the skill and sophistication 
necessary to understand the theories well enough to make such a 
commitment.141 Kant in his original texts is extraordinarily difficult to 
understand, and those who offer to make his teachings clearer are 
seldom that much more comprehensible.142 Perhaps students are ex-
pected to make an ad hoc path choice after reading a page or two 
summary (or even a chapter or two), but even stating that possibility 
shows its absurdity.143 
The second worry follows from the first. Even if a lawyer learned a 
great deal about the intricacies of the two (or more) competing theo-
ries, she still may not want to "opt in" to one camp in exclusion of the 
other. Sometimes, she might find the Kantian idea of dignity and au-
tonomy far more attractive than an opposing choice grounded in con-
sequentialist notions of efficiency or best interests.144 At other times, 
she might find herself relying on the utilitarian idea of using scarce 
resources efficiently, even if doing so fails to afford sufficient respect 
140. See, e.g., SAMUEL GoROWITZ ET AL., MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 543 (1976) 
(describing a medical school examination with the following instructions: "Describe a med-
ical situation in which different decisions might be made by a Kantian (or Rawlsian) on the 
one hand and a utilitarian on the other. Explain what the difference would be and how it 
would arise."); RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 25-27. 
141. While his Holmes Lectures arguments may be quite flawed in many respects, 
Judge Posner's assertion there about the inaccessibility of modern philosophical literature 
is hard to quarrel with. See Posner, Problematics, supra note 7, at 1670-71. At least one of his 
critical commentators agrees with him on that score. See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 
1794-95. 
142. An anecdote: I recently read John Rawls's Harvard University undergraduate lec-
tures on the history of moral philosophy, most of which covers Kant's writings. See RAWLS, 
supra note 136. At the risk of exposing my intellectual frailties (which, I suppose, have been 
readily apparent to readers thus far), I found this careful exposition of Kant's ideas still 
extremely difficult to assimilate and to understand in any comprehensive way. Even if I 
were to follow the very exquisite and careful logic of Kant, I confess that I would have some 
trouble relying on that analysis to guide my decisions in the hurly-burly of my law practice 
(or, for that matter, my everyday life). 
One notable exception to my criticism of modern writers about Kant would be Simon 
Blackburn's short work on moral philosophy, but that book offers the briefest and most 
cursory coverage of the body of Kantian thinking. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 116-24. 
143. See John Arras, Principles and Particularity: The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. LJ. 
983,989 (1994) [hereinafter Principles and Particularity] (criticizing this "menu" conception 
as a "Consumer Reports" model of applied ethics). 
144. Bradley Wendel reminds us of Derrick Bell's Space Traders story as a powerful 
argument against the pleasure maximization principle that one might understand to follow 
from consequentialist reasoning. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 213 (quot-
ing DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM 158 
(1992». 
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to individual plights.145 She rightfully objects to any efforts to induce a 
commitment on her part to a defined moral theory. 
The third worry then follows directly from the first two. The rea-
son why the lawyer resists commitment to a theory which could then 
determine her future actions is that her moral choices are not made 
in a deductive fashion, by applying a theory to a set of facts and deduc-
ing the right response from that syllogistic reasoning. The explana-
tion why the lawyer might find a deontological approach attractive in 
one setting and a utilitarian approach attractive in another is that the 
context determines her sentiments, and not a theory.146 Moral theo-
ries, and the mid-level principles that applied ethicists craft from the 
grander theories,147 reflect and organize sentiments drawn from work 
with actual cases. As many commentators have noted, when a carefully 
crafted theory clashes with deeply held moral sentiments, the theory 
gets jettisoned, not the sentiments.148 
Assignment of classic philosophical treatises, then, can have con-
siderable worth as they inform conversations about moral value, but 
not the worth that its proponents imply. Besides its inaccurate assump-
tion of deductive reasoning among deliberators, the theory concep-
tion fails to offer a method of assigning priorities or of ranking when 
145. I might use my own work as an example of this kind of "switch hitting." I have 
defended a fairly consequentialist approach to triage decisions within legal semces prac-
tice. See Paul R. Tremblay, "Acting a Very Moral Type of God": Triage and Poor Clients, 67 
FORDHAM L. REv. 2475 (1999). Elsewhere, I have defended a decidedly Kantian conception 
of individual autonomy and dignity in commenting on the proper role for lawyers working 
with possibly disabled clients. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer 
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515. Maybe I'm 
wrong on one of these stances, but it seems unlikely that I'm wrong because I have incor-
porated strands of different moral theory in my analyses. 
146. See, e.g., JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 40 (1988); Annette Baier, Doing With-
out Moral Theory, in POSTURES OF THE MIND 228, 230 (Annette Baier ed., 1985). 
147. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 15 (describing a process of reason-
ing from theories to principles to action). The role of principles in applied moral decision-
making remains very controversial, particularly among bioethicists. For a very recent 
iteration of the debate, see Henry S. Richardson, Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting 
Bioethical Principles, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 285 (2000); Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver and K 
Danner Clouser, Common Morality Versus Specified Principlism: Reply to Richardson, 25 J. MED. 
& PHIL. 308 (2000). For earlier contributions to this conversation, see RONALD P. HAMEL ET 
AL., BEYOND PRINCIPLISM (1993); A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BIOETHICS (Ed-
win R. DuBose ed., 1995); Ezekial J. Emanuel, The Beginning of the End of Principlism, 25 THE 
HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 37, 38 (July-Aug. 1995). 
148. This is the lesson of Derrick Bell's story about the Space Traders. See BELL, supra 
note 144, at 158. The observation in the text may be found in Principles and Particularity, 
supra note 143, at 988-91. 
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theories or principles conflict.149 The next Part addresses a technique 
of moral deliberation that builds upon this quality of moral theory 
and ethical principles. 
B. Casuistry As a Deliberative Technique 
As I have described at some length elsewhere,I50 the art of casu-
istry has garnered considerable attention among ethicists in recent 
years, particularly within bioethics.l51 Casuistry offers a method of 
moral reasoning and deliberation which resists theorizing and which 
builds upon common sentiments about normative value. "Unlike 
Kantianism, utilitarianism, coherentism, and contractarianism, [casu-
istry] does not claim to be an ethical theory."152 Casuistry's elements 
have been described cogently by the ethicist Carson Strong: 
[Casuistry] is a case-based approach in which an argument is devel-
oped by comparing the case at hand with paradigm cases in which it 
is reasonably clear what course of action should be taken. In addi-
tion, the comparisons of cases are made in terms of certain morally 
relevant factors, which I refer to as "casuistic factors" and which 
can vary from case to case. The decision which is best will depend 
on the extent to which these factors are present in the given case. 
Moreover, casuistry does not generally claim to reach certainty in 
its conclusions. The strength of the conclusions depends on the 
plausibility of the comparison with the paradigm cases .... Further-
more, casuistry does not claim to be able to resolve all cases. When 
disagreements ... cannot be resolved, it might sometimes be ap-
propriate to conclude that several alternative courses of action are 
. 'bl 153 permlSSI e .... 
The paradigm cases represent the source of shared sentiments. I54 
Most ethical dilemmas or quandaries consist of stories or circum-
stances where multiple, competing ethical principles or moral theo-
ries seem to apply, and how to rank or prioritize the conflicting norms 
is not readily apparent. In some of those stories or circumstances, the 
dilemma or conflict will be insoluble, for incomparability reasons de-
scribed by Bradley Wendel.l55 In those cases, despite the angst exper-
ienced by the agent who must proceed amidst the uncertainty, there is 
149. See Carson Strong, Specified Principlism: What It Is, and Does it Really Resolve Cases 
Better than Casuistry?, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 323,323 (2000). 
150. See Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30. 
151. The revival of casuistry has been attributed to the pathbreaking book by Stephen 
Toulmin and Albert Jonsen. SeeJoNsEN & TOULMIN, supra note 8. 
152. Strong, supra note 149, at 330. 
153. Id. at 331. 
154. See Braunack-Mayer, supra note 10, at 73; KUCZEWSKI, supra note 10, at 72. 
155. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. 
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no available right answer and her actions cannot be criticized. Of 
course, not all dilemmas or conflicts are so insoluble-if they were, 
ethical conversation would have no purpose. Ethical conversation and 
debate assumes that some issues are subject to reasoned analysis. Casu-
istry offers a coherent, practical method for that analysis. It permits 
the same kind of inductive, analogy-<iriven scrutiny that legal scholars 
employ when using common law precedent to decide on a right an-
swer in a difficult legal dispute.156 Law students perform that process 
regularly in substantive law courses; they might then be shown !l simi-
lar process in ethics contexts. 
Casuistry, thus described, invites reasoned, principled argument 
about ethics questions in a fashion which evades reliance upon per-
sonal opinions. It also allows, but does not require, sustained study of 
classic moral theories, and it need not ask participants to opt in as an 
adherent of one theorist's conception over another's. It works from 
the ground up, and in that way is anti-theoretical. Different cases will 
call for different answers and different analysis. The details of the 
cases will be critically important, and, in classrooms unconnected to 
practice, "thick" descriptions will fare better than "thin."157 It will 
leave matters at sea when the incomparability thesis applies, but those 
instances will be rather rare. 
Casuistry offers comfort and workability, of course, only if shared 
sentiments do predominate, or at least exist in some not-insubstantial 
way. Without agreement about paradigm cases, casuistry is no method 
at all. The remainder of this Part and the next Part develop further 
support for the thesis of shared, and non-idiosyncratic, value systems. 
Consider the following example where casuistry might refute a 
suggestion that value choices are idiosyncratic and personal, and that 
156. More accurately, it is the process employed by judges who must determine, ex-
pressly and publicly, a right and final answer to a disputed legal claim. See CAss R. SUN-
STEIN, LEGAL REAsONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 121-35 (1996) (describing how judges 
perform their duties as a form of casuistry); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 
HARv. L. REv. 741 (1995) (noting this quality of analogical reasoning in law and in prag-
matic thought). 
Practicing lawyers do not have to decide what the "right" decision might be in a case, 
for their role is to make the best argument possible for their side. Their duties, though, 
include analogizing from precedent, both in crafting persuasive arguments (which will im-
ply the right answer) and in determining the limits of their advocacy, that is, when their 
client's position cannot be defended in the face of contrary authority and precedent. See 
Stephen Pepper, Counseling at the Limits oj the Law: An Exercise in the Ethics and Jurisprudence 
oj Lawyering, 104 YALE LJ. 1545 (1995). 
157. See WALZER, supra note 85, at 1-19 (defending a thick perspective when con-
fronting moral questions); Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 521. 
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their conflicts are incomparable. In his brilliant exposition about the 
professionalism "crusade," Rob Atkinson describes three archetypes of 
lawyering stances, each of which has ethical support for its moral vi-
sion. 158 His Type 1 is the "hired gun," or the "Rambo" litigator-an 
aggressive, no holds barred advocate with zeal in his heart.159 Type 2 is 
the purposivist lawyer, the counselor who will respect the interests of 
third parties and attend to the underlying purposes of procedural 
and/ or substantive law, rather than exploit the law or procedure in-
strumentally.160 Type 3 represents the "cause" lawyer, as aggressive as 
the Type 1 lawyer but only for worthy clients (in contrast to Type 1, 
who will sell his services to the highest bidder) .161 
Atkinson offers an environmental litigation example to show how 
each of these lawyers would act differently in his or her representation 
of a client, but (and this is his prime point) "conscientious people" 
will disagree on principled grounds about the ethics of each one.162 
Stressing what he terms the "fallacy of the one true way,"163 Atkinson 
argues that many versions of good practice may coexist, and the critics 
have no right to treat as wrong anyone of the versions. Such criticism 
implies dogmatism and intolerance of each lawyer's personal 
ethics. 164 
158. See Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 303-12. 
159. Id. at 304-08. The hired gun lawyer has many defenders within the legal ethics 
world, including Charles Fried, Ted Schneyer, and Stephen Pepper. See Fried, supra note 
95; Schneyer, Hired Gun, supra note 99; Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A 
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613 [hereinafter Pepper, 
Amoral Role]. 
160. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 308-10. The Type 2 lawyer looks 
to David Luban and William Simon for her ethical support. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND Jus-
TICE, supra note 48, at 128-47; SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 138-69. 
161. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 3. Atkinson's evidence of ethical 
support for this Type is a bit more scant, but he includes himself, see Rob Atkinson, Beyond 
the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 5] MD. L. REv. 853 (1992), as one such defender. For a 
thorough exploration of the "cause lawyering" practice, see CAUSE LAWYERINC: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 
1998). 
162. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 305. 
163. Id. at 303. 
164. In his defense of the liberal neutrality thesis, Atkinson argues himself into a cor-
ner, it seems. His neutrality position appears clearest when he comments about the role of 
law professors teaching students. He writes, 
[P]rofessors should, in fidelity to the tradition of liberal education, eschew insist-
ing that the values of the current professionalism crusade or any particular vision of 
how to be a good person or a good lawyer is right or true, beyond dissection and critical 
examination. Conversely, they should insist that no conscientiously presented vi-
sion of lawyering, or, for that matter, of law itself, is beneath con-
tempt .... Without pronouncing what right and good ultimately are, [some] scholars 
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One might read the Atkinson taxonomy and conclude that here 
we have a vivid example of what we identified above as "incomparabil-
ity."165 Good moral arguments abound in this debate, and without any 
covering values each lawyer is left to her or his own sensibility, charac-
ter, and life story to choose her appropriate legal identity. 
The casuist is not satisfied, though. First, what could it mean to 
say that "conscientious people" might disagree about the propriety of 
the three advocacy types? Atkinson argues that the fact of this consci-
entious disagreement precludes teachers and bar leaders from taking 
sides. 166 That conclusion simply doesn't follow from its premise. The 
debates between, say, Luban167 and Simon168 on the one hand and 
Pepperl69 and Schneyer170 on the other might be insoluble, but we 
needn't automatically assume so. Atkinson implies that once some 
writers support a version of lawyering with reasoned arguments the 
debate is over. He rejects the possibility that those arguments might 
be flawed. To the extent that the debates about moral activism rest on 
historical analysis, factual assumptions, predictions about future be-
haviors, sociological data, and strands of logical reasoning, they can 
be assessed and evaluated for coherence and persuasiveness. Law 
professors assign B minus grades to students who perform legal analy-
sis but get the answers wrong. They do not assume that the students' 
having presented an argument precludes the professors from judging 
its cogency. So it ought to be with flawed moral arguments.171 On the 
other hand, if the moral activism debate ends with true incomparabil-
ity, because there are no covering values that permit the comparison 
to proceed, then Atkinson's proposal is defensible. That conclusion is 
have raised fundamental questions about discovering truth and protecting indi-
vidual autonomy-that purport to be its raison d'etre. 
Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 338 (emphasis added). It is puzzling, to say 
the least, to imagine how one might analyze, criticize, and "raise fundamental questions 
about" lawyering practices without some underlying premises about what might be right or 
good. Further, Atkinson implies that if such analysis and assessment demonstrate that 
some behaviors are wrong, the commitment to liberal ideology will prevent a professor 
from recognizing that fact, or from testing her students on their reasoning to arrive at that 
fact. Unless he is proposing a starkly subjectivist attitude toward moral beliefs, Atkinson's 
proposals here present insurmountable obstacles to good faith teachers. 
165. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. See also Wendel, Value Pluralism, 
supra note 34, at 141. 
166. See id. at 338. 
167. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 48. 
168. See SIMON, THE PRAcrICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47. 
169. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 159. 
170. See Schneyer, Hired Gun, supra note 99. 
171. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing Bruce Green's judge 
with idiosyncratic personal values). 
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a last resort, though, and not one to be drawn merely because the 
participants disagree. 
The casuist has a second objection to the neutrality thesis, 
though, which is stronger, and with which Atkinson might agree. Let 
us assume, for the moment, that the debate about the moral justifica-
tion of the various lawyering types is an insoluble one. Perhaps there 
are no covering values, or perhaps (a more likely scenario) there is no 
way to resolve the factual, sociological, and political disputes that un-
derpin the debate. We agree for now that we cannot conclude, ex ante, 
that acting as a Type 1 Rambo lawyer (the one we would most often 
criticize) is wrong. That concession does not disallow criticisms of 
Type 1 lawyering in a particular context. This is the deep casuistry sug-
gestion. Some Type 1 lawyering might be bad in some concrete cir-
cumstances, and a careful assessment of the facts of the case where the 
Type 1 lawyering occurs can permit that kind of moral judgment. 
As I noted, Atkinson seems to agree on this point. He refines his 
worry about the "one true way" approach of the professionalism cru-
sade by noting that a professional ideal that condemns incivility and 
aggressiveness across the board fails to accommodate those cases 
where justice requires tricks, rudeness, and aggression. 172 One might 
read his "fallacy of the one true way" complaint as casuistic-any hard 
and fast visions of a lawyer's role is problematic because it does not 
allow for individual context and circumstance.173 If that is his thesis, 
we are in substantial agreement. 
C. Sociological Evidence of Shared Nonns 
In this Part, I review recent empirical research on the divisions 
among middle class Americans on questions of value. The casuistry 
thesis presupposes many common and shared sentiments, repre-
sented in that methodology by paradigm cases. If most of us disagree 
about basic, fundamental values, as is frequently asserted, then not 
only is the casuist's project in some jeopardy, but also at risk is any 
effort to find reasoned grounding for conversations about ethics 
generally. 
The empirical work I review shows significant disagreement 
among Americans about morally-relevant topics, but not always, inter-
172. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at ~19. As he writes, "we are re-
minded of a classic ... formula for civility: never hurt another person's feelings-without 
meaning to. And, most of us would add, except for a good cause." [d. (citation omitted). 
173. This reading of Atkinson does clash with his insistence of liberal neutrality in 
teaching about good lawyering. See supra note 164. 
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estingly, at the level of value. The disagreements that surface far more 
often than not reflect different and conflicting perceptions about the 
world's operations, about human psychology and dynamics, and about 
factual propositions. People tend to agree about what they hold dear 
and important, and what constitutes bad acts or bad results. They ar-
gue instead about what causes or will encourage the good, and what 
might minimize the bad. 
The work that I review is that of Alan Wolfe, the prominent soci-
ologist and civic republican commentator who has surveyed middle 
class Americans about their moral, political, and religious beliefs.174 
His research consisted of elaborate surveys inquiring into beliefs, 
value preferences, and attitudes, and extensive follow-up interviews 
with carefully selected respondents, in order to understand more 
deeply and accurately the nature of their moral commitments. He dis-
sected the results of his work in two separate books.175 
Wolfe's studies demonstrate broad agreement among typical 
Americans about the obligation to act in morally defensible ways, as 
well as about the bases by which actions might be defended and justi-
fied. While his work shows substantial consensus about what "counts," 
it shows at the same time significant disparity in how his respondents 
balance conflicting commitments. Wolfe might beg to differ with the 
assertion that his respondents evince much consensus about right and 
wrong (his commentary is rather inconsistent on this score176), but a 
careful reading of their reports and narratives shows very little disa-
greement about the commitments that ought to matter. Their dis-
agreements in practice, in the application of the shared norms to 
individual circumstances, show them to be practicing casuists. 177 In a 
rather un persuasive argument, Wolfe criticizes repeatedly ordinary 
Americans' practice of justifying individual choices by complex bal-
174. See A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12; A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note 
12. 
175. See id. 
176. See, e.g., WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 168 (the respondents have 
"roughly the same views" about "fundamental questions about human nature, the forma-
tion of character, qualities of good and evil, and the sources of moral authority") com-
pared with id. at 199 ("[tJhe respondents ... take for granted something revolutionary: 
never have so many people been so free of moral restraint as contemporary Americans"). 
177. I noted in my earlier work on casuistry the similar observation by the ethicist John 
Arras: "it turns out that, like the bourgeois gentilhomme, we've all been 'practicing casu-
istry' all along .... " John D. Arras, Common Law Morality, 20 HAsTINGS CTR. REp. 35 (July/ 
Aug. 1990), referring to MOLIERE, THE WOULD-BE GENTLEMAN (1670). See Tremblay, The 
New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 526. 
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ancing of conflicting duties in a contextual, situational manner.178 I 
address that argument at the end of this Part.179 
Wolfe's report on the first set of investigations180 described his 
200 respondents' opinions about a number of the hot button "culture 
war" topics, including immigration, treatment of gays and lesbians, af-
firmative action, patriotism, welfare, and religion. He concludes, "on 
moral matters, there is no unanimity in America,"18I but notes at the 
same time that his research has "found little support for the notion 
that middle-class Americans are engaged in bitter cultural conflict 
over the proper way to live."182 Even as they argue about and disagree 
about each of the topics he explores, his respondents evidence broad 
agreement about what counts as good, but deep uncertainty about 
whether certain policies or programs contribute to that goodness. 183 
The respondents persistently reflect conflict between competing val-
ues, and uncertainty about how to resolve those conflicts. 
Wolfe follows his Middle Class Morality Project report with fur-
ther empirical study. In 2000 Wolfe conducted, in cooperation with 
The New York Times, a public opinion poll which asked Americans 
about "their views on sex, money, morality, work, children, identity, 
and God."184 Like with his earlier project, Wolfe followed the poll with 
in-depth interviews of 205 respondents from eight carefully chosen 
communities. 185 In reporting the results of the more recent survey 
and interviews, Wolfe developed a hypothesis he labels the "moral 
freedom" claim. His theory interests us here. 
178. See, e.g., A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 202 (referring to moral 
freedom as a "do-as-you-please affair"). 
179. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text. 
180. See Wolfe, One Nation, supra note 12. Wolfe, supported by the Russell Sage Foun-
dation, conducted what he called the Middle Class Morality Project, consisting of inter-
views with and a survey of 200 middle-class persons living in eight carefully chosen 
suburban communities. See id. at 18-31. 
181. Id. at 276. 
182. Id. at 278. 
183. For instance, Wolfe's respondents express some remarkably dated opinions about 
whether mothers should work, but those who are worried about that behavior express their 
worries by reference to harm to children. See id. at 94-111. On questions of welfare and 
immigration, the middle-class Americans express a variety of opinions, but the disagree-
ments rest on perceptions about the worthiness of the individuals who seek to immigrate 
or who apply for welfare. Those worthiness judgments, in tum, reflect factual assumptions 
(deeply held ones, we might presume) about why the individuals are in the position they 
find themselves in. See id. at 134-63 (immigration); 195-209 (welfare). 
184. A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 3. 
185. See id. at 4-5. 
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Wolfe's thesis is that Americans have lost connection with, and 
lost an unyielding adherence to, core, unquestioned traditional val-
ues, including" [w] ork, thrift, temperance, fidelity, self-reliance, self-
discipline, cleanliness, [and] godliness .... "186 He calls the practice of 
choosing one's values and making moral judgment calls on a case by 
case basis "moral freedom," and he considers acceptance of that kind 
of reasoning a dangerous and troubling one. 187 The claim of lost vir-
tue is, of course, a common one.188 If that claim is true, Wolfe's re-
spondents seem not to suffer from this amoral (or immoral) bent, if 
their conversations with Wolfe and his researchers are to be credited. 
None of Wolfe's respondents defends a personal morality which holds 
that work, or self-reliance, or self-discipline, or fidelity, or thrift, and 
so on, is not something to be valued. That would be an unusual and 
pretty un persuasive position to adopt.189 
What Wolfe does observe, however, is a resistance to an unwaver-
ing commitment to anyone virtue; like those in his earlier study, his 
respondents continually weigh certain core values against others as 
they search for meaning and coherence in their lives. Wolfe describes 
this casuistry in unflattering terms usually,190 but it is readily apparent 
that the citizens with whom he spoke care a great deal about doing 
what is right. A brief review of two virtues he examines will make this 
point clear. 
186. [d. at 66, quoting GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES 5 (1999). 
187. See id. at 198-232. 
188. Wolfe cites, among other authorities, WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES: 
A TREASURY OF GREAT MORAL STORIES (1993), and ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE 
AMERICAN MIND (1987). 
189. There is evidence of some respondents rejecting the "godliness" virtue, but it is 
hard to imagine that Wolfe could seriously be troubled by the occasional incidence of 
atheism within American culture. See A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note 12, at 39-87. 
190. See, e.g., A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 223 (stating: 
Listening to the way our respondents talk gives a certain amount of credence to 
those who argue that contemporary Americans have too much freedom for their 
own good. When they decide whether to tell or shade the truth, to stay with their 
job or family or leave, to discipline their instincts for the sake of long term re-
ward, and to forgive but not forget, our respondents are guided by subjective 
feelings more than they are by appeals to rational, intellectual, and objective con-
ceptions of right and wrong. It is not standards of excellence to which they turn, 
but what seems best capable of avoiding hurt to others .... Without firm moral 
instruction, Americans approach the virtues gingerly. They recognize their impor-
tance, but since they are wary of treating moral principles as absolute, they 
reinvent their meaning to make sense of the situations in which they find 
themselves. ) 
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One of the virtues which critics, including Wolfe, see as lost today 
is that of honesty.191 In older, and better, times, it seems, people told 
the truth most of the time; nowadays people fib or lie and don't see it 
as a problem when they do so. Recalling the Kantian position that all 
lies violate the categorical imperative,192 Wolfe worries that "Ameri-
cans think about honesty as a conditional, not absolute, value . . . . 
This is a way of thinking that, because it encourages relativism, would 
not sit well with classical theories of the virtues, but it is widespread 
nonetheless."193 There mayor may not be less honesty than in past 
eras, but people recognize honesty as an important virtue. Among 
Wolfe's respondents, no other virtue "was brought up as spontane-
ously, and as frequently, as honesty."194 The citizens interviewed be-
lieved that honesty was an obligation presumptively, but not 
invariably. Story after story from the respondents evidenced a commit-
ment to truthfulness unless some overriding harm or trumping con-
sideration made honesty unwise.195 That position is hardly an immoral 
one; indeed, Kant's dogmatic opinion to the contrary, the negotiabil-
ity of honesty is among the most widely held moral positions among 
ethicists today.196 
Wolfe's claim that "[n]either St. Augustine nor Immanuel Kant 
would find much to admire in the way modem Americans think about 
honesty [because] [w]hether they live in local communities or big cit-
ies, Americans do not believe that telling the truth constitutes a moral 
command they ought always to obey"197 is a hollow and unfair criti-
cism. That description shows not that the people he met had impover-
ished values, but rather, one might argue, that their values were 
enriched, for they recognized, or tried to recognize, when adherence 
to an absolute standard would cause greater moral harm than deviat-
ing from it. It may be that the respondents have made those casuistic 
choices poorly, but Wolfe's stories do not show that to be the case.198 
And even if it were the case that the citizens were unskilled casuists, 
191. See id. at 97-130. 
192. See id. at 97 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philan-
thropic Concerns, in GROUNDINGS FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65 (1981 ed.)). 
193. [d. at 125. 
194. [d. at 101. 
195. See id. at 102-09. 
196. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1989); 
Wetlaufer, supra note 29, at 1230-32; Loder, supra note 29, at 46-48. 
197. A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 109. 
198. There is some evidence that the moral choices about honesty made by the respon-
dents were perhaps a bit difficult to square with a principled casuistry. For instance, one 
person, after claiming that "I consider myself to be really honest," volunteered that "I will 
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and made the wrong call often, that fact does not render them lacking 
in a commitment to values. As they repeatedly told the researchers, 
they believed in honesty unless being honest caused some greater 
harm. 
Wolfe's reports and commentary about the virtue of loyalty re-
flect a similar pattern. "Of all the virtues presumed to have been lost 
in America, loyalty generally takes pride of place," he writes. 199 Critics 
of the declining moral state of contemporary America lament the rise 
of self-interested, individualistic thinking and the accompanying de-
cline in commitment to family, employer, and local community.20o 
One might conclude from such reports that ordinary people hold dif-
fering views about the value of loyalty, with some holding it dear and 
others not considering it to be an important norm. 
Wolfe's interviews belie that conclusion. It may well be, as Wolfe 
insists, that his respondents are less loyal than traditional Americans 
used to be, in the sense that they tend to divorce more often, change 
employers with more frequency, and relocate communities with less 
apparent regret than previous generations. Their actions, though, do 
not represent a betrayal of loyalty or a rejection of that virtue. Instead, 
his respondents repeatedly report a commitment to loyalty and a re-
spect for it as a value.201 The difficulty for most people is balancing 
the loyalty commitment with other, conflicting commitments. Loyalty 
is an accepted and valued character trait, but it is not a trump, particu-
larly when adherence to that value causes considerable harm or be-
trayal of other commitments. 
The best example of the moral casuistry evidenced by Wolfe's sto-
ries is that of divorce. Wolfe quotes conservative commentators who 
interpret rising divorce rates as unambiguous proof of the loss of loy-
alty as a real virtue in contemporary American culture.202 The stories 
he relates, however, show a significantly more complicated phenome-
non. Americans demonstrate a very strong commitment to marriage 
and to the loyalty promise that the marriage vows represent.203 They 
cheat the IRS if! have a chance. And insurance companies, I would cheat them too." Id. at 
108. 
199. Id. at 23. 
200. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LAsCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITE AND THE BETRAYAL OF DE-
MOCRACY 5-6 (1995). 
20l. See, e.g., A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 29,34,35,52,53 (quoting or 
paraphrasing respondents who value loyalty and struggle to balance differing loyalties). 
202. See id. at 45 (quoting BARBARA DEFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997)). 
203. See id. at 49-50 ("Many of those with whom we talked made it clear that they were 
anything but frivolous in the way they thought about divorce .... Americans think hard 
about the conditions under which divorce is or is not justified."). 
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are unwilling, however, to accept the virtue of loyalty as blanket justifi-
cation for perpetuating abuse, harm to children, or deep unhappiness 
of the marriage partners.204 No participant in the Wolfe study n:jected 
loyalty as a good or viewed marriage as a trifle which one might ignore 
if something more interesting happened by. Perhaps some in America 
subscribe to that view, but few of us have met them, and fewer would 
take them seriously if we did. Instead, the respondents struggle hard 
and deeply as they balance the agreed-upon value of loyalty with the 
similarly-shared goals of avoiding harm, escaping physical and emo-
tional abuse, raising well-adjusted children, and leading more produc-
tive lives.205 Perhaps the critics charging that loyalty ought to serve 
essentially as a trump would argue that these latter goals should be 
sacrificed in the interests of the virtue of loyalty. It's not hard to con-
clude that such an argument would be, at a minimum, unsettling. 
If Wolfe's respondents are to be taken seriously-and they cer-
tainly sound familiar to us in their stories and in their struggles with 
moral conflict-the critics who charge that Americans have lost their 
commitment to loyalty, and that the loss is an altogether regretful 
thing, are mistaken. The argument that Americans have idiosyncratic 
value systems and personal preferences that have little in common 
with one another simply does not find support in Wolfe's stories and 
surveys. What might be true, however (and this may be a better inter-
pretation of the critics' lament), is that the respondents are making 
poor choices in their casuistry, in their balancing of the several values 
which they share. Barbara Defoe Whitehead may be arguing that 
those who divorce today are overestimating the benefits of divorce 
and underestimating its harms.206 That contest, though, is not one 
about values. It is instead about facts, supported by research and inves-
tigation into plausibly empirical data. It may not be easily resolved, 
but it lends itself to some conceivable resolution separate from the 
debate about a ranking or trumping of virtues. It is the kind of inquiry 
that casuistry contemplates.207 
204. See id. at 52 ("Remaining in an abusive marriage can be taken as an expression of 
loyalty, but it can also be viewed as a violation of the principle never to condone cruelty."). 
205. See, e.g., id. at 60 ("The decline of a conception of loyalty in which people pledge 
to remain together until death do them part can be keenly felt, but it is not clear whether it 
can or should survive the onset of new ways in which loyalty is redefined to accommodate 
itself to how we actually live.") (emphasis added). 
206. I suspect that she would indeed make those arguments. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 
202, at 7-8. 
207. See Albert R. Jonsen, Strong on Specification, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 348, 350 (2000) 
(stressing importance of the "set of particulars" in the working of casuistry). 
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I end this exploration of Alan Wolfe's investigation into Ameri-
can values with some brief comments on his critique of "moral free-
dom," for his criticisms bear directly on the struggles in professional 
schools surrounding teaching about professional and personal values. 
Wolfe's ultimate thesis in his most recent book is that moral freedom 
is a tragic thing.208 Moral freedom, in his eyes, permits Americans to 
decide for themselves what is right, and that permission invites dan-
gerous self-interested choices. The result of the emergence of moral 
freedom is worrisome moral decline, because the traditional virtues of 
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, loyalty, and hard work are no longer 
accorded the almost non-negotiable respect that they used to receive, 
before moral freedom arrived.209 As Wolfe writes: 
Moral freedom means that individuals should determine for them-
selves what it means to lead a good and virtuous life. Contemporary 
Americans find answers to the perennial questions asked by theolo-
gians and moral philosophers, not by conforming to strictures 
handed down by God or nature, but by considering who they are, 
what others require, and what consequences follow from acting 
one way rather than another. 
[N]ever have so many people been so free of moral constraint as 
contemporary Americans .... For if there are no binding moral 
rules-if individuals are as free to drop or add their moral beliefs 
with the same alacrity with which they buy or sell stocks-then all 
social relationships, including those of free exchange, will be 
threatened. 210 
It is difficult to understand Wolfe's point here. Perhaps he offers 
a lament, a longing, or a dirge: "In earlier times, people did not think 
about right or wrong. Instead, they obeyed higher powers and 
respected higher principles reflexively. They respected the virtues, 
and life was better as a result."211 If that is his point, we can hear him, 
even if we may disagree about either the description about whether 
people were so reflexive or whether the result of the blind adherence 
was altogether a good thing. But his point seems also a prescriptive 
one, a call to return to those better days. As such, it is essentially 
tautological. 
208. A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 198-231. 
209. See id. at 199. 
210. [d. at 195, 199, 201. This argument has been made by another virtue adherent in 
her description of modern judges. See MARy ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: 
How THE CRlSIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 152 (1994) 
(modern liberal judges are free "from the constraints of statute, precedent, Constitution, 
or tradition"). 
211. The quote is mine. Wolfe seems to be describing the halcyon classical times in 
America. See, e.g., id. at 209-11. 
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Wolfe cannot plausibly urge Americans to become unthinking 
again, to reject reasoning about right and wrong in favor of blind, 
non-cognitive212 acceptance of traditional virtues. He apparently fails 
to appreciate that he himself exercises his "moral freedom" when he 
develops, in the year 2001, reasoned arguments in favor of returning 
to earlier times when none of us thought about what might be a better 
way to live, or believed we had the right to think about it. He undoubt-
edly concludes that moral and civic life would be better if we adhered 
to higher authorities without our deciding for ourselves how to answer 
questions about moral value. He might be right about that conclusion 
(although there is good reason to doubt him), but by the very submis-
sion of his argument he refutes it, for he is choosing, and not blindly 
and not in a non-cognitive fashion, a better way to live a moral life. In 
doing so, he is exercising his moral freedom. 
Aside from its tautological essence, Wolfe's argument confuses 
moral freedom with moral irresponsibility, and reflects a deep worry 
about the latter despite very little, if any, evidence of it from his 
surveys and interviews. He worries that "in the absence of binding 
moral rules, what prevents me from deciding, after you had given me 
possession of the car I agreed to buy from you, that I ought to keep 
my money after all?"213 This question disrespects, in a profound way, 
his respondents and misunderstands their commitment to shared 
norms and to collective values. It is from his surveys and interviews 
that he seems to have discerned the pattern of moral freedom, yet not 
one of his respondents has asserted that stealing a car is a good thing, 
or expressed any similar opinion from which Wolfe could draw such 
an inference. They may well reject a universally binding rule con-
demning stealing in every instance, so that a husband might be justi-
fied to steal drugs from a pharmacist to save his dying wife.214 
However, in doing so they will not conclude, as Wolfe implies, that 
because no binding rule exists, any stealing that helps them at the 
moment is morally acceptable. Indeed, Wolfe himself seemingly can-
not identify any such binding rules which he would defend as non-
negotiable.215 
212. Wolfe explicitly suggests that the antidote to moral freedom is non-cognitive 
moral assessment. "Our capacity to act rationally is dependent upon a morality that evolves 
outside our cognitive control." Id. at 201. 
213. Id. 
214. I borrow this story from Carol Gilligan's work. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 25-32 (1983). 
215. Wolfe is obviously deeply suspicious of allowing ordinary persons to make their 
own moral choices, but in each moral topic he explores, Wolfe reports sympathetically that 
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This review of Wolfe's work offers insights into the virtues of casu-
istry. Wolfe's rich and detailed stories and reports show that plain per-
sons accept, by and large, the basic elements of a good and virtuous 
life, including the supposed "lost" virtues. Plain people do disagree, 
though, at the level of application, and the product of that disagree-
ment might initially appear as a dangerous form of relativism or lack 
of "moral backbone."216 The temptation in response to such disagree-
ment may be to call for a commitment to firmer principles or stricter 
rules, but that proposal is doomed, for no body of rules or principles 
or virtues can avoid the call for individual choice when the rules or 
virtues or principles conflict. Wolfe's respondents demonstrate a per-
sistent casuistry, but we cannot tell from his reports whether it is a very 
good or skillful casuistry. These plain persons may be making self-in-
terested choices rather than well-reasoned ones, as Wolfe implies. The 
remedy for that problem, assuming of course that they wish to arrive 
at more defensible or better decisions, is to teach the skill of casuistry 
more widely. This same lesson will apply, of course, to lawyers and law 
students. 
IV. What About the Felons, the Whores, and the Jerks? 
The previous two Parts explored moral deliberation ideas, and 
assumed for the sake of discussion that the lawyers and law students in 
question desired to be better moral deliberators. In this Part we meet 
up with the rest of the profession. What about those lawyers who, from 
all indications, just don't care about doing what's right? Do we have 
anything to say about them? 
Whether we have anything to say about, or to, them depends on 
who these folks are, and, indeed, whether they exist at all. Consider 
four possibilities: 
1. Maybe They Don't Exist at All 
It is at least conceivable that what we obseIVers witness as evi-
dence of unscrupulous behavior by unscrupulous lawyers is, in 
fact, good faith moral choice amidst complex circumstances, 
which we critics cannot understand or evaluate from our distant 
perspective. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of the seemingly 
bad behavior within the profession is explainable in this fash-
ion, but the arguments developed here, and the arguments of 
most ethicists describing the nature of moral inquiry, suggest 
sometimes circumstances exist where one might, for good reason, choose not to adhere to 
that virtue. See id. at 99 (honesty), 51 (loyalty), 163 (forgiveness). 
216. [d. at 91. 
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that our ability to evaluate moral choice from a distance is a frail 
one.217 By this assumption, the behaviors suspected to be antiso-
cial and/or criminal are in fact correct and justified. The mis-
take is ours, not the lawyers'. 
2. Maybe They're Felons, Whores, and Jerks, and That's the End of the 
Story 
The next possibility is the one that many assume to be the case: 
Some lawyers are simply without moral fiber, will cheat and lie 
and steal for their own personal gain, and (most important for 
this categorization) don't care to act any differently. While we 
have all met some lawyers who we suspect fit this bill, our gen-
eral sense is that this sociopath description is quite rare. For 
present purposes, we can assume that if such persons exist, it is 
unlikely that our teaching, example, or professing will make a 
whit of difference. Maybe therapy or drugs or jail time will im-
prove these lawyers' behavior, but that's for another commenta-
tor to explore.218 
3. Maybe They Do Bad Things but They Tried to Get It Right 
This possibility is different from the first two. By this assump-
tion, the lawyers we observe and worry about look like felons, 
whores, and jerks, but did not intend to end up there. Unlike 
the second category, these lawyers want to get it right. Unlike 
the first category, they didn't-so here, the critics are right. For 
these lawyers, perhaps, teaching about ethical deliberation 
might make a difference. For them, all we have explored in the 
previous two Parts will apply. 
4. Maybe They're Overwhelmed and Out of Control 
We now reach an entirely different set of assumptions about 
who these bad lawyers might be, or why they look like bad law-
yers to us. In this category, the lawyers do bad things; no argu-
ments there. They know their actions are bad, so their 
reasoning isn't flawed or unsophisticated, but they care and 
worry about having done the bad stuff. And finally, they did the 
bad stuff because of powerful pressures and fears over which 
they, at that moment, experienced little (or, at least, insuffi-
cient) ability to control. These are our most interesting bad law-
yers and, I suspect, the most common ones. 
705 
It is hard to know with much certainty which of the above expla-
nations accounts for the bad behavior of the felons, the whores, and 
the jerks, but one might make some educated guesses. For much of 
the unscrupulous or criminal conduct the critics worry about, it seems 
reasonably unlikely that the lawyers in question just deliberated lll-
217. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 195. 
218. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (reporting the comments of John Dean). 
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eptly, thinking they were doing right but guessing wrong. It also seems 
equally implausible that the bad lawyers were simply sociopaths, with-
out any shred of a conscience. I've met few lawyers who appear that 
soulless (although I've encountered many nasty characters in my years 
as a clinical supervisor), and none of my students have ever fit that 
bill. On balance, it seems far more likely that the wretched actions 
that embarrass the profession result from a more complicated mix of 
institutional forces, undeveloped character, and psychological frailty. 
Lisa Lerman's elaborate investigation into the stories of lawyer 
overbilling offers some helpful insights on this point.219 Lerman 
researched a number of high profile, large-sum billing and account-
ing fraud cases emanating from prestigious law firms across the coun-
try. The lawyers whose misdeeds she reports stole, in some cases, 
millions of dollars from clients and partners.220 In addition to convey-
ing the extent of this kind of behavior, Lerman asks "Why did they do 
it?"221 Her hypotheses support the proposition described above. She 
inquires into the possibility that these unscrupulous lawyers were "bad 
apples,"222 which seems to equate with my "sociopath" thesis,223 and 
she finds no evidence to support that theory.224 She also rules out 
mental illness as a likely culprit.225 
Lerman's most plausible explanations point to the culture of the 
law firms, the culture of modern corporate America, and the absence 
of the kind of stable bonds and supportive community that might of-
fer strength and courage in the face of enormous pressures to suc-
ceed, and to make a lot of money.226 Her ideas are consistent with 
219. See Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, sufrra note 56. 
220. See id. at 233-45. 
221. [d. at 252. 
222. [d. at 255-57. 
223. See sUfrra note 216 and accompanying text. 
224. See Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, sufrra note 56, at 257-58. From her research about 
the lawyers' reputation, background, and other activities, Lerman concludes that the law-
yers were "the least likely suspects" to have demonstrated a lack of moral restraint. Most of 
the lawyers rationalized their actions and, when caught, expressed seemingly sincere re-
morse. See sUfrra note 56 and accompanying text (predicting that the felons, whores, and 
jerks would offer some arguments defending their bad behavior). 
225. [d. at 257. Some of the lawyers alleged forms of mental illness in their defense to 
the charges, but Lerman concludes that serious mental illness was not sufficiently evident 
to serve as a broad reason for the overbiIling and cheating. 
226. Lerman suspects a powerful "fear of falling" among the high-powered, very suc-
cessful lawyers who fell victim to the urge to pad their accounts. See id. at 254. She also 
notes the growing importance of money as the benchmark of success within the profession, 
and the accompanying pressures on practicing lawyers to measure their worth by that stan-
dard. See id. at 219. 
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those of many other thoughtful critics.227 The felons, whores, and 
jerks may be less "bad" as people and more stuck in a maelstrom from 
which they have neither the wherewithal nor the courage to extract 
themselves. 
If that suggestion is correct, at least for some of the felons, 
whores, and jerks, the implications for ethics instruction are signifi-
cant. As Eleanor Myers argues: 
While there is surely a role for education in influencing moral or 
ethical behavior, that role should be properly understood. Even 
the finest moral education-one that teaches the rules of the pro-
fession, attempts to cultivate the capacity for reflective moral judg-
ment, and actively engages students in values clarification and 
moral choice-is likely to be undermined if the workplaces in 
which our students practice systematically undercut expressions of 
personal values or constrain the exercise of judgment.228 
It seems plain that the law schools will not effect significant 
change within law firm culture in the short term.229 In fact, some see 
the prime purpose of law schools as to enculturate students to the law 
firm world.230 The prospects of altering and improving the ethos of 
law firms by participation in "professionalism" and "civility" activities 
of the Bar seem equally futile. 231 Perhaps the modeling of virtuous 
behavior by law professors, especially in clinical programs where stu-
dents can experience pressures and tensions in a direct way, will help 
students begin to develop moral insights and character traits necessary 
227. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 49, at 828-29; Tanina Rostain, The Company We Keep: 
Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Practice of Law, 21 
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1017, 1035 (1996) ("The sociological findings suggest that current 
trends toward increased practice specialization will severely hamper the development of 
[the] affective qualities [necessary for moral practice]. A radical reorganization of the legal 
profession may be required if deliberative ideals are to be realized on any meaningful 
scale."); Jack L. Sammons, The Professionalism Movement: The Problems Defined, 7 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 269,276-79 (1993); Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and 
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 
912-15 (1999). 
228. Myers, supra note 49, at 829. Myers'S quote implies a conception of "personal" 
values that I have sought to undermine earlier in this article. See supra notes 93-102 and 
accompanying text. That possible disagreement with this thesis of this article does not un-
dermine the importance of her point about the professional culture. 
229. See Richard A. Matasar, The Two Professionalisms of Legal Education, 15 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 99, 100 (2001). 
230. See Jonathan R. Macy, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in American Law 
Schools, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1937, 1952 (1993). 
231. For sustained criticism of the bar's professionalism "crusades," see Atkinson, Dis-
senter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 263; Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, 
at 1230-33. 
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to maintain integrity within the competitive world of high-priced 
lawyering.232 
It is not easy to be sanguine, of course. The fundamental struc-
tural and institutional problems of law practice, as Deborah Rhode 
reminds us, cannot be separated from the influence of money.233 So 
long as the pursuit of profit, perhaps not of the money itself but for 
the value that annual income has come to represent in the competi-
tive differentiation of winners and losers within large firm culture,234 
remains the raison d'etre of law firms in the United States, the capacity 
for law schools to overcome the institutional forces faced by vulnera-
ble lawyers will probably be minimal. But others do offer some hope. 
Prominent scholars argue that a richer conception of moral responsi-
bility and accountability,235 as well as greater efforts to foster the exer-
cise of complex judgments about practice,236 might reduce the 
alienation and dissatisfaction so prevalent among lawyers these days. 
Less alienation, in turn, may lead to healthier approaches to moral 
choices, and stronger character to resist the pressures to cheat in or-
der to win. Less alienation might also imply a stronger and more 
meaningful sense of community among practicing lawyers, and for 
many scholars the potential for community and a sense of belonging 
relates strongly to the development of moral character.237 
Conclusion 
My puzzling about the challenges of talking about, and then 
teaching about, values and ethics leads to some tentative conclusions. 
First, it seems to matter a lot whether we intend to teach this subject 
because we want to add to the students' repertoire as moral deliber-
232. Cf Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 9, 32-33 
(1995) (suggesting that "moral activist" lawyering must be modeled in clinics, even if poor 
clients' interests are betrayed in the process). 
233. D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 31. 
234. See id. at 33; Schiltz, supra note 227, at 904-06. 
235. See D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17; Baron & Green-
stein, supra note 104, at 97. 
236. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, 109-37. 
237. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable 
Profession:" The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 859, 893 (2000) ("it is within com-
munities-within families, religious congregations, and friendships-that we can find 
moral foundations"); Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, supra note 56, at 254-55 (noting a lack of 
"stable professional bonds" on the part of the lawyers who succumbed to the pressure to 
cheat); Sammons, supra note 227, at 295-98 (lamenting the "increasing corruption of the 
larger society as it becomes a community without the civic friendship upon which the lib-
eral tradition depends and without the decency upon which the civic friendship 
depends"). 
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ators, or because we want to persuade or encourage them not to act 
badly in practice. It helps to see that the two goals are different, and 
that one might be more attainable than the other. Second, it seems, 
contrary to some thinking, that conceptions of value are neither 
ephemeral, personal, idiosyncratic, nor non-negotiable. One can lo-
cate a rich overlapping consensus about what counts as good. The 
differences among persons on moral questions that appear so en-
trenched and so irresolvable may be both of those things, but perhaps 
not because of differences in values. Instead, those conflicts often will 
represent differing perceptions about the world, and not about what 
constitutes a good, or a virtue. Third, having recognized the possibility 
of consensus, teachers may teach about values in precisely the same 
way that teachers teach about law. Contrary to what we might suppose, 
argument about moral positions is no less reasoned, analogical, and 
structured than argument within legal analysis. Within bioethics, a 
process of evaluating moral choice using the consensus represented 
by paradigm cases has gained much credibility and acceptance. That 
process, known as casuistry, offers opportunities for the same kind of 
principled discussion about values-not "personal" values, or "idiosyn-
cratic" values, but values as shared notions of the good-among law 
students and lawyers. 
Finally, for the "felons, whores, and jerks" among us, we have less 
optimism about changing their behavior and fewer insights developed 
from the puzzling process. A few important observations, though, do 
seem warranted. If the sophisticated chroniclers of the deliberative 
method are right, then it is more difficult to be certain that the seem-
ingly nasty professionals are in fact acting nastily. If the critics are 
right that the nasty professionals are indeed nasty, the question then 
becomes why they act in this way. It seems unlikely that they are true 
sociopaths, and unlikely that they intended to act correctly but just 
missed the mark. The remaining possibility is that the nasty profes-
sionals are not nasty, as such, but are weak and overwhelmed, and 
succumb to enormous institutional pressures to cheat and to win. 
That likely possibility creates particular challenges to those educators 
who hope to inspire, instill, or otherwise encourage an ethos of good-
ness in their students. 
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